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 Preface 
In the African continent the establishment of the AU in 2002 was important 
for the development of a new African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA). In response to the African reform dynamics and the emerging inter-
national security agenda, external actors have begun to adjust their instru-
ments and rethink their choices for action. New security concepts and recent 
approaches in development and other policies seek explicitly to support the 
peace and security architecture in Africa. When it comes to external support, 
these developments have led to a search for changing approaches spanning 
foreign, security and development policy. 
This study sets out to analyse the new APSA in the context of changing con-
cepts of external support for it. It was conducted by a research team during 
the 2005/2006 training course organized by the German Development Insti-
tute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / DIE). The whole study was 
carried out in close collaboration with our partner, the Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS), which is based in Pretoria / South Africa and has a well estab-
lished network in the African continent. The ISS’s input was guided by its 
Executive Director, Dr. Jakkie Cilliers, and supported and inspired by Prince 
Mashele, senior researcher at the ISS. I am grateful for this extremely fruitful 
collaboration. 
During our stay in Ethiopia and South Africa (February to April 2006) we 
conducted a number of interviews with representatives of the AU, NEPAD, 
African embassies, donor institutions, other international organizations 
(NATO etc.) and think-tanks. In addition, we had the opportunity to visit the 
United Nations Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). I would like to 
thank all interviewees and everyone who helped to prepare and carry out the 
study. 
 
Bonn, April 2008    Stephan Klingebiel 
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Executive Summary
Background and purpose of the study 
Peace and security have become priority issues for the African continent and 
the international community. In the last few years in particular, the interna-
tional community’s heightened perception of peace and security issues has 
been accompanied by a greater willingness on the part of African states and 
institutions to take action. In the African continent the establishment of the 
African Union (AU) in 2002 is important for the development of an African 
peace and security architecture (APSA). In response to the African reform 
dynamics and the emerging international security agenda, external actors 
have begun to adjust their instruments and rethink their choices for action. 
New security concepts and recent approaches in development and other poli-
cies seek explicitly to support the peace and security architecture in Africa. 
When it comes to external support, these developments have led to a search 
for changing  approaches spanning foreign, security and development policy.  
Against this background, the present study sets out to make a contribution to 
ongoing discussions on how development policy can support the new African 
reform dynamics in the field of peace and security. More specifically, it seeks 
to answer the following question: How does development policy contribute to 
the strengthening of the APSA in the context of external assistance? It mainly 
considers the actors in African institutions, the international donor commu-
nity and the international research community, which is taking a growing 
interest in related issues. 
Nexus between security and development 
It is, generally speaking, no new task for development and security policies to 
have to define their relative positions. However, since the late 1990s the 
debate on the nexus between development and security policies (the latter 
including both foreign and defence policy) has gained ground. It is not only 
inherent necessities but also politics that shape this debate and its outcome: 
on the one hand, development policy has recognised that it will be hard to 
eliminate poverty without a significant reduction in violent conflicts; on the 
other hand, security policy has taken a growing interest in creating stability in 
conflict-prone regions with a view to making the countries concerned more 
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secure. Actors in the development arena have various options for managing 
the interfaces of the two policies at both conceptual and operational level.  
Four distinct models can be identified for the relationship between develop-
ment policy and security policy: (i) distancing, for maintaining independence 
from goals of other policies; (ii) complementarity, for identifying a division 
of labour based on common goals; (iii) cooperation, for ensuring close coor-
dination of development, security and foreign policies; and (iv) subordination 
of development policy to a short-term security agenda focused on donors’ 
self-interest. Different ways of managing the nexus entail different opportuni-
ties and risks.  
Development policy and security policy are rapidly drawing closer together. 
Africa is the most important region to experience this dynamic. It can be seen 
in African reform activities and in external contributions to these activities. 
The African Peace and Security Architecture 
The creation of the AU in 2002 must be seen as an important step towards a 
new peace and security architecture. In structural terms, the AU offers a set 
of new proactive conditions (e. g. the principle of non-indifference), whereas 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), its predecessor, had a largely un-
satisfactory record in the field of peace and security. This was due to its in-
hibiting principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of its 
member states. Owing to a number of positive developments at regional level 
and the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) initiative, the 
AU is now seen as presenting a realistic approach to the concept of  “African 
solutions to African problems”. 
The main pillars of the APSA include (i) the AU and (ii) the Regional Eco-
nomic Communities (RECs). (i) The most important elements of the AU’s 
structure are its Assembly of Heads of State and Government and its Peace 
and Security Council (PSC), the main decision-making organs. The Commis-
sion of the AU and its Directorate for Peace and Security are required to 
implement and coordinate the PSC’s decisions. (ii) The RECs are considered 
to be the building-blocks of the AU and are primarily responsible for the 
implementation of AU policies. Whilst the AU should coordinate, monitor 
and establish policies and act at political level, the RECs are meant to imple-
ment at regional level decisions taken at continental level. At present, eight 
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RECs have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the AU. However, 
this is inconsistent with the AU’s vision of having only five RECs represent-
ing its five regions. 
Only some of the RECs (ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD) are experienced in 
the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. In terms of peace 
operations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is 
by far the most experienced and active regional organisation. There is no 
doubt that regional structures are needed to stabilise relations, to prevent the 
spill-over of conflicts and to consolidate emerging common values. However, 
even the relatively advanced RECs have no effective crisis response struc-
tures.  
The RECs have a central role to play in the creation of an African Standby 
Force (ASF). The ASF is important for a security architecture that includes 
military options. It will be developed by 2010 in two phases and will be 
available for activities ranging from observer missions to peacekeeping or 
peace-enforcement operations and post-conflict activities. The force will be 
composed of five standby contingents, with predominantly military compo-
nents, in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment. The AU 
has identified five regions that should supply standby contingents, and 
ECOWAS and the SADC have already built up some regional military capac-
ity and deployed troops in the past. 
In general, the African Union has taken some impressive legal and institu-
tional steps to transform itself into a credible and major actor for peace and 
security in Africa. Its willingness to intervene militarily has been demon-
strated especially in the case of Darfur. Despite the promising developments 
in the area of peace and security in Africa, the success of the AU and the 
RECs will depend on whether they manage to establish fully the operational 
peace and security institutions.  
African leadership and regional powers play an important role within the new 
African peace and security architecture. The implementation of the ambitious 
peace and security agenda at continental level through the AU and at regional 
level through the RECs largely depends on the political will and active en-
gagement of  regional powers (especially South Africa and Nigeria). In addi-
tion, civil society forms part of the APSA. A small number of civil society 
organisations are contributing to the APSA at continental or regional level, 
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through research, policy advice and training activities, for example. 
Special Relationship between the AU and UN 
In the area of peace and security, the UN is a unique partner of the African 
Union, particularly with regard to peacekeeping operations. Four types of 
operation in the African continent can be identified:  
1. UN peacekeeping missions,  
2. the deployment of missions of regional or continental organisations in the 
continent, with or without support from the UN,   
3. co-deployment, i. e. the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops alongside 
those of regional organisations, and 
4. combinations of 1 and 2, i. e. the sequencing of a mission by a regional 
organisation and a United Nations mission. 
The AU’s mission in Darfur (AMIS) was deployed in a highly complex po-
litical and humanitarian situation. The fact that the AU sent a significant 
number of troops into the crisis area is a success in itself. The decision taken 
in July 2007 to mount a joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid Opera-
tion (and the earlier operation in Burundi) shows that there is a need for fur-
ther discussion of a modus operandi for future operations in general and the 
“AU first, UN later” model in particular. 
Donor Contributions to the APSA 
Donors are becoming increasingly involved in peace and security in Africa. 
External support comes from various policies (development, defence and 
foreign policy) and from a number of bilateral and multilateral donors. It can 
be analysed from various angles: 
(1) Levels and areas of support. Level of support refers to support for organ-
isational structures of the APSA, which include the AU, the RECs, civil soci-
ety and regional powers (“trilateral cooperation” aimed at supporting South 
Africa’s capacity to engage in post-conflict situations in the African conti-
nent). Within these levels, donors engage in different areas of support that 
can be subdivided into five different categories: (i) capacity-building for the 
political and administrative structures, there being two main instruments used 
by donors to enhance the AU’s and RECs’ capacities in the area of peace and 
security: a UNDP-administered pooled fund and capacity-building funds 
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from the EU; (ii) early warning: support for early warning systems is either 
channelled through the regional organisations, mainly IGAD, or focuses on 
the development of the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), 
the principal donors being the EU, the USA, the UK and Germany; (iii) en-
hancing military capacities: support in this area focuses mainly on the devel-
opment of the ASF, the leading partners including France, the UK, the USA, 
Canada and the UN. At regional level, donor support is concentrated on mili-
tary training and peacekeeping training centres; (iv) support for African peace 
operations: most support goes to peace operations and above all to the AU 
mission in Darfur, followed by smaller missions such as those in the Central 
African Republic (CAR ) and Burundi, the principal donors being the USA, 
the EU and Canada; (v) post-conflict reconstruction: support in this area has 
thus far played a marginal role. 
(2) Modes of delivery: Donors offer a multitude of modes of delivery when 
supporting the APSA. The African Union, the main partner in this regard, 
does not have any clear preferences in the short and medium term. In the long 
term, however, the AU favours budget support. Owing to Africa’s flexibility 
in the short and medium term, the modes of delivery usually reflect the do-
nors’ preferences. Overall, six modes of delivery can be identified: equip-
ment/support in kind, financial support, budget support, technical support, 
pooled support and trilateral cooperation. These modes of delivery have been 
identified because of their interesting features (for example, advantages of 
pooled funding for the AU due to reduced transaction costs). 
(3) Management of the nexus between development and security policy: In 
this area examples can be found of the distancing approach (e. g. Germany’s 
institutional setting and concepts for supporting the APSA), of the comple-
mentary approach (e. g. Canada’s aligned strategy) and of the cooperation 
approach (e. g. UK’s Africa Prevention Pool and the EU’s African Peace 
Facility). There is no overall “best nexus management model”. However, 
more coherent and harmonised approaches have several advantages, in terms 
of significance and reputation, for example.  
(4) Other challenges: Other major challenges to external support for the 
APSA occur in the following three areas: (i) coordination and harmonisation 
among donors, (ii) demand-orientation towards the needs of the AU and 
flexibility, and (iii) predictability of donor support and the volume and origin 
of funding. 
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Conclusions  
Conclusions can be drawn on three thematic areas: 
(i) State of the APSA : Generally speaking, the development of the APSA is 
proceeding satisfactorily, despite the challenges the AU faces in several re-
spects. Factors suggesting positive change have been the AU’s ability to act 
at political level to mandate peacekeeping missions and the steps it has taken 
to establish an African Standby Force and to set itself an ambitious political 
agenda. The challenges the AU faces include striking the right balance be-
tween establishing its structures and intervening in emergency situations, 
such as Darfur, to create stability. It may also want to consider focusing more 
on conflict prevention and post-conflict issues with a view to correcting the 
current bias towards military capacity-building.  
The African Peace and Security Architecture is indeed still fragile and does 
not constitute a fully operational structure as such. One major problem is the 
relationship between the AU, RECs and NEPAD, which is still in its infancy. 
The RECs, the AU’s implementing agents, are very heterogeneous and at 
very different stages in the development of their peace and security mecha-
nisms. For a functioning structure, all these interdependent elements need to 
work together effectively. 
(ii) External support: External support for the APSA from all policies 
development, defence and foreign - is essential for the APSA. Unless these 
policies pay increasing attention to peace and security, the African structures 
will be de facto incapacitated. Technical, financial and logistical support is 
crucial in terms of both establishing the APSA structurally and enabling 
peacekeeping operations to be undertaken. External political pressure and 
increased media attention can create the pressure needed if the AU is to live 
up to its constitution and resolutions. 
(iii) Nexus management: External actors need to apply their competencies 
and strengths in all three areas of policy – development, defence and diplo-
macy – in helping to construct a viable peace and security architecture in 
Africa. Notwithstanding this insight, it should be noted that, as these areas of 
competence cannot be neatly separated from each other, they call for close 
collaboration, or what can be called “nexus management”. 
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The engagement of the various policies in support of the APSA suggests the 
emergence of a sensible division of labour between development policy and 
security policy. In general, development policy should continue to focus on 
strengthening the APSA’s civilian components and on building bridges be-
tween the civilian and non-civilian areas, whereas security policy has a strong 
comparative advantage in providing support for the military aspects of the 
APSA. 
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1 Introduction 
Peace and security have become priority issues for the African continent and 
the international community. Since the mid-1990s, the international commu-
nity’s heightened perception of peace and security issues has been accompa-
nied by a greater willingness to take action. Where the African continent is 
specifically concerned, the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 
is important for the development of an African peace and security architec-
ture (APSA). Through it, the AU structure provides more effective mecha-
nisms for the achievement and maintenance of peace and security in Africa 
than its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).  
In response to African reform dynamics and the emerging international secu-
rity agenda, external actors have begun to adjust their instruments and rethink 
their choices for action. New security concepts can be observed in the major-
ity of multi-, supra- and bilateral donors, explicitly aimed at supporting the 
peace and security architecture in Africa. These developments have led to a 
search for and even, in some cases, to the adoption of comprehensive ap-
proaches spanning foreign, defence and development policies. The interfaces 
and overlaps between civil and military areas of cooperation have increased 
significantly. The development and conceptual sharpening of these compre-
hensive approaches have become a major challenge for donors, especially 
with regard to sub-Saharan Africa. 
Study question  
The study therefore sets out to make a contribution to the ongoing debate on 
how development policy can support the new African reform dynamics in the 
field of peace and security. The ways in which donors deal with the afore-
mentioned new challenges are discussed with a view to identifying possible 
new avenues and constructive ideas for donor engagement. More specifically, 
the study seeks to answer the following question: How does development 
policy contribute to the strengthening of the APSA in the context of external 
assistance? The study question is vital, since development policy is attaching 
increasing importance to the field of peace and security in Africa, and yet 
there is a lack of relevant monographs and studies. To answer the question, 
an overview is given of the underlying defence and foreign policy strategies 
and their use of military and diplomatic instruments, while development 
policy strategies and instruments are examined in depth. The consideration of 
both security policy and development policy in the study is important because 
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of the potential overlaps, complementarities and tangencies between the poli-
cies that have to be borne in mind. In this way, we hope to fill the information 
gap currently to be observed in the relevant literature on the engagement of 
development actors within the APSA.  
By mapping and analysing donor activities, the study is principally addressed 
to representatives of African institutions and to actors in the international 
donor community. Information on forms of cooperation between the actors 
involved in peace- and security-related issues in Africa and the resulting 
recommendations will be aimed mainly at this audience. The study is also of 
interest to the international research community, which is becoming increas-
ingly engaged in the debate on the security-development nexus and the Afri-
can Peace and Security Architecture.  
By asking “how” contributions are made, the study focuses on the manner in 
which donors provide assistance. This is understood and analysed in five 
different dimensions, which will be discussed in the report: areas and levels 
of support, modes of delivery, nexus management, coordination of donor 
support and demand orientation of donor support.  
The international community contributes to different levels and areas of sup-
port. Level of support in this context refers to support for the organisational 
structures of the APSA, which include the AU, the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs), civil society and regional powers. Within these levels, 
donors engage in five different areas of support: (1) capacity-building for the 
political and administrative structures of the AU and the regional organisa-
tions, (2) early warning systems, (3) enhancement of military capacities, (4) 
support for peace operations and (5) post-conflict reconstruction. The focal 
areas of donor support will be illustrated  with the aim of revealing any im-
balances. 
Modes of delivery describe the manner in which external actors provide their 
support. There are different models of modes of delivery, examples being 
“in-kind” contributions, “in-cash” support, budget support, technical support 
and trilateral cooperation. Current preferences for the various modes of sup-
port will be highlighted, and the advantages and disadvantages of each in-
strument will be discussed.  
When development policy engages in supporting the APSA, interfaces exist 
between it and security policy. The way development policy and security 
policy manage these interfaces will be called nexus management. Four mod-
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els of nexus management relating to the interfaces between foreign, defence 
and development policy will be applied to the empirical data that have been 
collected. The way development policy deals with the new challenges posed 
by this nexus and the impacts of each model will be discussed and high-
lighted with the aid of empirical findings. 
Coordinating development efforts has been at the centre of the debate in the 
international donor community. The study therefore also considers how and 
how far donors coordinate their support for the APSA. Available coordina-
tion concepts gleaned from principles formulated by the development com-
munity, such as harmonisation of standards and complementarity of action, 
will be applied to the empirical data. The results will be used to determine the 
implications of coordination efforts for the APSA. 
The orientation of demand to the APSA must be taken seriously in a context 
where donors  support an “African solutions to African problems” approach. 
The extent to which donors’ instruments and strategies do in fact allow for 
demand orientation will therefore also be investigated in this study.  
As development policy acts in the same sphere as security policy to some 
extent and the boundaries between the two policies are fading, a clear defini-
tion of development policy, adapted to the peace and security context, is 
needed for this study. Thus, without seeking to provide a generally valid 
definition of development policy, the study analyses development policies1 
where measures are (i) implemented by development actors or (ii) financed 
from funds devoted specifically to development.  
Research methodology 
The study was conducted in three phases: preparation, empirical research and 
evaluation. During the preparatory phase in Germany, we analysed the exist-
ing literature in order to become acquainted with the current debate and to 
gather information on the subject. Experts from several governmental organi-
sations and think-tanks2 were interviewed. Furthermore, potential interview 
                                                          
1 For a definition of development policy, see Box 1. 
2 Including the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
(BMZ), the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), the European Union (EU), the Bonn International Center for Conver-
sion (BICC) and the Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (InWEnt). 
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partners in Africa were contacted, and the research design was developed and 
discussed in depth with the study counterpart, the Institute for Security Stud-
ies (ISS).  
Box 1: Terminology 
Security: For the term security, a narrow concept of human security is used, with 
the focus primarily on the protection of individuals and communities against vio-
lence (Human Security Centre 2006). It thus covers all aspects of “freedom from 
fear” and includes “freedom from want” only if it is conflict-related. At the same 
time, it is important to note that this notion does not exclude a state’s need for na-
tional security, for only a state that is secure can safeguard its own citizens. 
Peace: The term peace will be understood to mean positive peace. Positive peace 
may be more than just the absence of overt violent conflict and include a range of 
relationships up to a level where nations – or any groupings in conflict – have col-
laborative and supportive relationships. 
Security policy: Security policy includes all measures suitable for the prevention, 
management and resolution of internal and international conflicts between citizens 
or states. As the multidimensional notion of security policy includes diplomatic, 
military and development resources, defence policy is only one part of security 
policy. 
International actors: The term international actors will be used where actors are 
not of African origin, e. g. donor countries and international organizations. 
Continental: The term continental will be used where the AU or the whole of 
Africa is meant, the term regional for the African regions, e. g. North Africa, West 
Africa, East Africa, southern Africa, etc. 
Development policy: In line with the definition of Official Development Assis-
tance, the term development policy is used where grants or loans (i) are allocated to 
developing countries on the DAC List, (ii) are allocated by the official sector, (iii) 
have as their main objective the promotion of economic development and welfare 
and (iv) are provided on concessional financial terms, meaning that a loan must 
have a grant element of at least 25 per cent. In 2005, the High Level Meeting of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD/DAC) increased the contributions that may be reported as 
official development assistance (ODA) in peace- and security-related areas, e. g. 
training the military in non-military matters and expenditures on peacekeeping 
activities (OECD/DAC 2005a). 
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The main empirical research was conducted in Ethiopia and South Africa, 
since both countries play an important role in the APSA. The capital of 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, is the site of the headquarters of the African Union 
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and of 
key embassies and donors contributing to the APSA. The group therefore 
focused on interviews with staff of the African Union and donors contribut-
ing to it. Consequently, our interviewees in Addis Ababa comprised all rele-
vant representatives of the AU Peace and Security Department (the Conflict 
Management Centre, Strategic Planning Unit, Peace Support Operations 
Division, etc.), the Political Affairs Department, the Secretariat to the Com-
mission and representatives of the AU/United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) project. We also interviewed representatives of the Darfur 
Integrated Task Force (DITF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), UNECA and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPKO). In addition, we talked to representatives of embassies and de-
velopment agencies from Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, In-
dia, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK and the USA, 
as well as stakeholders from the African embassies of Algeria, Congo Braz-
zaville, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.  
In Ethiopia, we had an opportunity to visit the United Nations Mission for 
Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). We conducted interviews with the Indian 
battalion for the central sector and the military observers at the Adigrad 
headquarters. This visit enabled us to gain an insight into the UN’s opera-
tional level and helped us to analyse and assess the relationship between the 
AU and the UN. 
The secretariat of the NEPAD, major embassies and most of the think-tanks 
that study peace and security issues are located in South Africa, which is also 
one of the key regional powers within the APSA. In South Africa we col-
lected data by interviewing representatives of think-tanks, donors and gov-
ernments in the NEPAD secretariat, the South Africa Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs, the Human Science Research Council, the Institute for Global 
Dialogue, the Africa Institute of South Africa and Safer Africa and the em-
bassies of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden.  
The interviews with donors produced information on their current and future 
activities in the peace and security field, enabling us to analyse their man-
agement of interfaces, their modes of delivery and their local implementing 
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institutions. African actors were interviewed on  their own current and future 
activities in the APSA and their perception of donor contributions.  
We discussed the balance between support for military and civilian activities 
and the balance among the various areas of support with African actors and 
representatives of the international community. We were also interested in 
their perception of integrated mission concepts, i. e. activities that include 
military and civilian components. In addition, relations between the AU and 
the UN and between the AU and RECs were analysed with a view to identify-
ing redundant activities and driving forces in the new APSA.  
During the evaluation phase, the interviews were examined. In several feed-
back loops, the preliminary results were checked and, when necessary, devel-
oped further. A workshop at the Institute for Security Studies and various 
selected experts, mostly from think-tanks, verified the findings of the study.  
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is the counterpart in this research 
project. The ISS has been working on peace and security topics for years. It is 
located in Pretoria and has branch offices in Addis Ababa, Cape Town and 
Nairobi. The concept of this study was discussed with Prince Mashele, a 
senior researcher at ISS, during his two-week stay in Bonn in December 
2005. He also joined the team during several phases of the field research in 
Ethiopia and South Africa in 2006.  
Structure of the report 
After an introduction in Chapter 1, the report continues with the conceptual 
background (Chapter 2) to the study, i. e. the current debate on the relation-
ship between development and security and its manifestation in recent Afri-
can reform dynamics. Chapter 3 examines the strengths and weaknesses of 
the entities that form part of the African Peace and Security Architecture and 
their relation to each other. Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between the 
AU and the UN and focuses on practical forms of cooperation in the peace 
and security field. Chapter 5 examines the approaches adopted by multina-
tional, supranational and bilateral actors who support the African peace and 
security architecture. While outlining donors’ diplomatic and military activi-
ties, the report concentrates on their development instruments. In this analyti-
cal part of this study, five dimensions of cooperation, namely areas of sup-
port, modes of delivery, nexus management, coordination of donor support 
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and demand orientation are analysed. The conclusion in Chapter 6 summa-
rises the findings and makes policy recommendations. 
2 The nexus of development and security policy  
This chapter is intended to give a brief introduction to the conceptual debate 
on the nexus of development and security policy and to the reform dynamics 
in Africa that have prompted international development policies to engage in 
the security field in the African continent. 
It is not a new task for development and security policies to have to define 
their relative positions. Since the 1990s the debate on the links between them 
has gained ground. It is not only inherent necessities but also politics that 
shape this debate and its outcome. Political actors in the development arena 
have various options for managing the interfaces between the two policies 
both at strategic level and at financial and operational level. When political 
actors are deciding how to manage these interfaces, they must take various 
risks and opportunities for development policy into consideration. This chap-
ter will discuss these issues. However, a general answer cannot be given to 
the question as to what action should be taken. 
2.1 Overall developments 
The relationship between development and security policy has undergone a 
number of changes since development cooperation entered the policy sphere. 
The beginning of development cooperation in the wake of de-colonization 
coincided with the beginning of the Cold War. At that time, development 
policies were used mainly as instruments of foreign and security policies. 
Both Cold War blocs used development cooperation to reward friendly re-
gimes and to tie them to their respective spheres of influence. Over the years 
international development cooperation widened its focus from economic 
growth to include other topics, such as the environment and gender issues. 
“Yet the international aid industry carefully avoided peace, security and 
conflict issues” (Tschirgi 2006, 47). 
After the Cold War ended, a more holistic view of development and conflict 
issues was taken (UN 1992, 1994). This gave rise to the concept of human 
security (UNDP 1994). Within this concept, the traditional focus of safe-
guarding states and their territories has shifted to human individuals. The 
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concept of human security is protective to the core. Individuals are to be 
protected against threats to their lives or basic livelihoods over which they 
have no control. Financial crisis is likely to pose such a threat  just as much 
as violent conflict (Alkire 2002). The most recent conceptual developments 
in the creation of a holistic view of development and conflict have been the 
“The Responsibility to Protect” agenda of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2005) and the UN Secretary-
General’s report “In larger freedom” (UN 2005a). 
Consequently, the distinction between development policies dealing with 
domestic socioeconomic issues and security policies dealing with intergov-
ernmental political and military issues has softened since the end of the Cold 
War. This it true of both policies, of both policy arenas and of the issues 
concerned. 
Throughout the 1990s, development policy expanded its arena to the interna-
tional sphere and engaged in security issues. It became evident that the nation 
state no longer constituted the appropriate policy arena for solutions to many 
problems, such as pandemics and environmental pressures. Development 
policy therefore had to break out of the policy arena confined by national 
boundaries if it was to address its traditional challenges successfully. It also 
became involved in traditional security issues. On the one hand, it  tried to 
establish instruments for the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts. 
On the other hand, it became sensitive to potentially counterproductive ef-
fects of its interventions. “Do no harm” (Anderson 1999) became a new 
guideline for development cooperation.  
Security policy has moved in the opposite direction. It has expanded its pol-
icy arena to the space within national boundaries and become involved in 
such new issues as gender and the Acquired Immunedeficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS). These changes are easy to see at the level of the United Nations 
(UN) and also of various states. The Security Council has enlarged its re-
sponsibilities to include the protection of civilians in war, small arms, gender 
and AIDS. UN peace operations are no longer limited to keeping the peace 
previously established between and with the consent of two or more sover-
eign states: they have also begun to enforce peace within states by military 
means. The former principle of all parties consenting to peacekeeping opera-
tions has thus become non-mandatory. New civilian tasks have accompanied 
this expansion of military tasks (UN 2000). Policing, disarmament, demobili-
sation and reintegration of former combatants have become standard prac-
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tices. In the cases of Kosovo and East Timor peace operations even took over 
the direct administration of these territories. The establishment of the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission at the end of 2005 is the latest step in these de-
velopments.  
2.2 Reasons for the current nexus 
Development policy concerns itself with violent conflicts for various reasons. 
Developing countries account for 90 per cent of all wars and other violent 
conflicts. Many countries benefiting from Western development cooperation 
are consequently experiencing, or have recently experienced, violent conflict. 
Violent conflicts hinder and reverse economic and human development. They 
claim many peoples’ lives and increase the likelihood of state failure (BMZ 
2005a). Collier et al. argue that the average income of a country after a civil 
war is 15 per cent lower and the incidence of absolute poverty 30 per cent 
higher. They also claim that child and overall mortality rates rise sharply 
during a war and remain higher thereafter. Another effect of war is an in-
crease in Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection (HIV) (Collier et al. 
2003). “The security-development nexus is therefore extremely important for 
development co-operation.” (BMZ 2005a). 
Security and development are correlated, but it remains unclear how a holistic 
approach by development and security policies should cope with these issues. 
While the correlation between a lack of security and underdevelopment is 
well established,  the direction of causality remains unclear (Tschirgi 2006). 
Such circular arguments as “no development without security and no security 
without development” are the response to these findings. Yet there are con-
flicts over scarce resources and of objectives that development and security 
policies cannot escape in this way (Maihold 2005). Instead, they must be 
deliberately resolved by political actors.  
Since 9/11 the “securitisation” of development policies (Brock 2004) and the 
“developmentisation” of security policies have gained ground. The terrorist 
attacks have revealed the vulnerability of Western countries. It is generally 
accepted that homeland security can no longer be achieved with military 
defences at national borders. Consequently, fragile states, civil wars and 
poverty are seen as direct threats to the well-being and security of Western 
states (Tschirgi 2006). Development policy has therefore incorporated secu-
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rity issues in its strategies and operations, and security policy has done the 
same with development issues.  
In particular, the war on terrorism “is refocusing aid resources on those sub-
populations, regions and issues seen as presenting a risk to homeland secu-
rity” (Duffield 2006, 11). The idea of development cooperation securing and 
bettering people’s lives in developing countries as a goal in itself may come 
to an end. Yet development policy can also gain in importance on the politi-
cal agenda and so receive additional resources with the backing of security 
policy. The events of 9/11 have given actors in the development arena the 
opportunity to exchange the moral and ethical legitimisation of development 
cooperation for hard political reasoning (Maihold 2005).  
2.3 Managing the nexus 
Interfaces between development and security policy can be found at different 
levels, from strategies to financing and operations. These interfaces may 
directly or indirectly concern interests of both policy arenas. Some have just 
come into existence as a more holistic view of development and conflict has 
spread; others have already existed for a long time, though possibly neglected 
by political actors.  
Overarching strategies for development in conflict-affected countries and 
regions or for security in or of developing countries are examples of the con-
ceptual level. Political actors in the development and security arenas may 
exchange information on their respective strategies or develop joint strate-
gies. At the financial level, the financing of non-civil instruments by devel-
opment actors or of civil instruments by military actors are possible inter-
faces. Sometimes development and military actors may also compete for 
funds targeted at activities in overlapping fields of interest. At the level of 
operations, many possible interfaces exist. The two policies can work to-
gether in whole-of-government activities. Development actors can also “con-
tract” military actors to enable and secure their operations and vice versa. 
Another option is for the military to engage in development-oriented activi-
ties, as in the case of NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine. 
And many joint activities are already being undertaken in the field of capac-
ity-building (Klingebiel / Roehder 2004). 
Four distinct concepts can theoretically be established for development policy 
to manage its interfaces with security policy (Klingebiel / Roehder 2004): 
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Distancing: Development and security policy could retain their autonomy and 
not interact. This would ensure the independence of their respective goals. 
Development policy could then focus on its long-term objectives, such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). At the same time, it would forfeit 
its leverage over security and foreign policy with respect to countries suffer-
ing from conflict. Nor could development policy influence the framework of 
security needed for development. 
Complementarity: It is also possible to implement complementary policies on 
the basis of commonly agreed goals. In this scenario policies would comple-
ment and correspond to one another. Coherent and efficient policies could 
then be implemented without their having to give up their autonomy and 
distinct areas of responsibility. However, the influence the two policies had 
on each other might not be equally strong. 
Cooperation: Development policy could coordinate closely with security and 
foreign policies. This would make for more coherent policies and enable 
development policy to have a stronger influence on military interventions and 
security and on foreign policies. In return, development policy might have to 
adhere to shorter-term, military objectives. It might also have to shift its fi-
nancial resources from its long-term goals to short-term goals in the security 
sphere. 
Subordination: Development policy could securitise all its policies. It might 
then have a chance of receiving more funding. But it must be borne in mind 
that a causal link has yet to be clearly established between development and 
conflict, let alone between development and terrorism. This in turn creates 
significant difficulties for successful policy interventions. If, then, develop-
ment policy bases its legitimacy on its ability to prevent terrorist attacks in a 
concept of endangered self-interest, development policy and development 
cooperation may themselves be endangered. 
2.4 The nexus in Africa 
Peace and security have also played an important role in recent reform dy-
namics in Africa. The newly established African Union (AU) is at the core of 
this process. New instruments to secure peace have been established and the 
principle of sovereignty has given way to a principle of non-indifference. 
However, these ambitions need to be transformed from words into enduring 
deeds. For this to happen, the inertia of some actors in Africa must be over-
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come, and external actors, who have recently discovered their interest in the 
continent, should support these efforts. 
Peace and security have become a priority on Africa’s political agenda. Such 
positive tendencies as an increase in the number of stable and democratically 
governed states and a decrease in the number of violent conflicts and wars 
have been observed in Africa over the last decade. Nonetheless, sub-Sahara 
Africa remains the region of the world most severely affected by violent 
conflict and war. Recognising the important role of security as a precondition 
for development, African leaders have increased their efforts to prevent and 
resolve violent conflicts in their continent.  
The Human Security Report therefore suggests that the decrease in violent 
conflict is not a result of changes to the underlying risk factors, but rather of 
increased involvement of the international community and African regional 
organisations in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Human 
Security Report 2005, 4). As Cilliers stresses, underlying Africa’s security 
crisis is its serious developmental failure; the common denominator of civil 
war and conflict in Africa is poverty, and much of that poverty is the result of 
bad policy and poor governance (Cilliers 2004, 27). 
In July 2002, 53 African nations launched the AU at their meeting in Durban, 
South Africa. The transition of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into 
the AU has brought major changes to the African peace and security agenda. 
The principle of sovereignty has given way to the principle of non-
indifference, the aim being to protect human lives. The AU is thus the first 
international body to acknowledge “The Responsibility to Protect” agenda 
(Powell 2005). At the same time, it must be admitted that these changes do 
not automatically translate into action and that some actors will have a strong 
interest in adhering to the traditional principles of state sovereignty and non-
interference. 
The Constitutive Act of the AU (AU 2000) and the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (AU 2002) envisage a 
strong continental security regime capable of preventing, managing, and 
resolving conflicts in the African continent. The Constitutive Act declares 
that the African Union has “the right to intervene in a Member State pursu-
ant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances: namely 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU 2000). As war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity have been defined in interna-
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tional law, they could serve as clear criteria for interventions. “Implicit in 
these provisions is the understanding that sovereignty is conditional and 
defined in terms of a state’s capacity and willingness to protect its citizens” 
(Powell 2005). 
To live up to its promises, the AU is developing capacities for conflict pre-
vention, early warning, quick reaction, conflict resolution and post-conflict 
reconstruction in collaboration with African Regional Economic Communi-
ties (RECs) and the NEPAD. The AU consolidates the information obtained 
from subregional warning systems and coordinates the African Standby Force 
(ASF). It is also planning to establish a Panel of the Wise to negotiate in 
conflict situations by diplomatic means. Each REC has been asked to develop 
or reinforce an early warning system and an ASF. NEPAD’s African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) is intended to prevent conflict by ensuring good 
governance. NEPAD is also developing strategies for post-conflict recon-
struction. 
African reform dynamics come at a time when the international community is 
increasingly discovering its interest in the continent. Donor countries use 
their development, security and foreign policies to assist the reforms. Despite 
all efforts in the African continent, the reforms are largely dependent on this 
external assistance. Yet the heavy reliance on donors in the peace and secu-
rity field is no exception: it matches the overall influence of donors in Africa. 
ODA accounts for 55 per cent of all external flows to the region (Klingebiel 
2005d). The international community must support the African peace and 
security architecture financially, logistically and politically if it is to persist 
and live up to its pledges. African states do not provide even half of the Afri-
can Union’s ordinary annual budget of US$ 150 million. Peacekeeping opera-
tions, like that in Darfur, cost several 100 millions of US dollars a year. The 
African peace and security architecture also lacks the infrastructure needed to 
operate effectively. International actors have a further role to play in support-
ing national and regional political efforts to address the root causes of con-
flicts.  
2.5 Outlook 
The nexus between development policy and security policy is developing 
dynamically. Africa is the most important region in which these dynamics 
manifest themselves. They can be seen both in African reform activities and 
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in the external contributions to those activities. The following chapters will 
reveal how different African actors comprehend the nexus between peace and 
security and how they act in response to it. It will be shown how donors un-
derstand this nexus and how their various policies manage it. The interaction 
between the AU and donors will also be considered. Does the donor commu-
nity allow for African ownership in such a politicised area that is also highly 
dependent on donor support? Does one policy dominate in the contributions 
given or requested? How does the cooperation between donors and AU strike 
a balance between the different objectives of security and development? With 
these insights a number of conclusions will be drawn to inform the overall 
debate on managing the nexus of security and development policies. 
3 The new African peace and security architecture: 
institutional and programmatic change 
Although the African Union’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), had engaged in conflict resolution in Africa since its inception in 
1963, it did so with a restricted mandate and had little impact on peace and 
security in Africa. The replacement of the OAU with the AU in the year 2002 
raised hopes of change, especially with regard to the peace and security 
agenda. Generally, as its Constitutive Act states, the AU seeks to promote 
progressive political and economic integration, democratic societies and 
sustainable development as a whole, on the basis of African-owned strategies. 
In terms of content and institutional development, the area of peace and secu-
rity has been the most dynamic and has attracted most donor attention. Break-
ing with the tradition of the OAU, the Constitutive Act introduces the pio-
neering intervention clauses Article 4 (h) and Article 23 (2), which provide 
for sanctions on AU members that fail to comply with the AU’s decisions. 
Article 4 (h) underlines the AU’s right to intervene in member countries in 
the event of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (AU 2000). 
This led Powell to comment that “the transition of the OAU to the AU ush-
ered in far-reaching changes to the pan-African peace and security agenda, 
particularly with respect to the parameters of sovereignty and intervention 
for human protection purposes” (Powell 2005, 2). The African Mission in 
Sudan, for example, has shown that long-standing principles of state sover-
eignty and indifference to the internal affairs of other countries have been 
watered down – and that the AU is willing to act to protect its citizens.  
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The AU is not only proposing programmatic change but has also set in mo-
tion a process of rapid institutional development to ensure a robust architec-
ture, especially with regard to peace and security. A few years after the offi-
cial inauguration of the AU in Durban in 2002, the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of the AU have therefore launched organs intended to ensure a 
higher degree of enforcement and oversight of AU decisions, especially those 
concerning security and good governance in the continent. They include the 
Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) (Cilliers / Sturman 2004). The PSC and its 
supporting organs are central components of the new peace and security ar-
chitecture, covering the areas of conflict prevention and management and 
post-conflict reconstruction.  
Although the AU is struggling to develop its human and financial resources 
and faces internal political challenges when it comes to turning words into 
deeds, its aim of providing “African solutions to African problems” is taken 
seriously by donors. The European Union (EU), a major supporter of the AU, 
has noted that the AU has earned “international respect as a credible and 
legitimate political actor and agent of change” (EU 2005c). 
In fact, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), founded in 
2001 on the initiative of five African leaders, preceded the AU in providing 
an Africa-wide, dynamic response to Africa’s problems. Its programmes 
concern the AU’s peace and security agenda in so far as they relate to gov-
ernance issues and socio-economic development. This is because a lack of 
governance is seen as nurturing the potential for conflicts, and socio-
economic development is considered instrumental in both conflict prevention 
and post-conflict reconstruction (NEPAD 2006b). Within the broader frame-
work of peace and security, both the AU and NEPAD continue to receive 
support from donors. It remains to be seen whether NEPAD will be inte-
grated into the AU as decided at the Maputo Summit in 2003 or whether it 
will continue to act independently in the peace and security field (AU 2003a).  
In this chapter we examine the AU and the RECs as the main institutional 
pillars of the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): while the 
former is responsible for devising policies, the latter implement them at re-
gional level. Furthermore, civil society’s role in the APSA is significant in 
several respects; on the one hand, it can ensure capacity-building for the 
AU’s peace and security agenda; on the other hand, it can perform a watch-
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dog function, providing the AU with the necessary legitimacy and credibility. 
The importance of popular participation and civil society for peace, security 
and stability is reflected in the launching of the Pan-African Parliament in 
March 2004 and of ECOSOCC in 2005 and in the establishment of the Afri-
can Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in January 2004. However, no 
matter how far-reaching the institutional and programmatic change has been 
since the establishment of the AU, it is ultimately African leaders who deter-
mine the success or failure of the new peace and security architecture: they 
are the AU’s ultimate “owners” and can be either “drivers” or “spoilers” of 
change.  
To enable the reader better to assess donor contributions to the APSA, this 
chapter gives an overview of the African structures that are being set up to 
ensure peace and security in the continent. Thus we analyse the progress so 
far made in implementing the AU’s peace and security vision. In this, we take 
into account the main challenges that face the AU structures, the RECs, the 
regional players and civil society in fulfilling their roles within the peace and 
security architecture.  
3.1 Structure of the African peace and security 
architecture 
A brief overview of the structures of the African peace and security architec-
ture as defined in the PSC Protocol will be followed by an analysis of the 
challenges facing implementation. At the highest decision-making level 
within this architecture is the Assembly of the Union, consisting of all Af-
rica’s Heads of State and Government (except Morocco’s), which gives di-
rectives to the Executive Council (Foreign Ministers of AU members). 
Since the PSC was established in May 2004, it has acted as the AU’s standing 
decision-making vehicle and implementation structure for the management of 
conflicts, war and other emergency situations and for the restoration of peace. 
According to the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Se-
curity Council, “the PSC shall be a collective security and early-warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis 
situations in Africa”. However, there are limits to its powers: although the 
PSC – in conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission – may author-
ise the mounting and deployment of peace support missions, no military 
action may be taken without the consent of the Assembly. 
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The PSC operates at three levels – Permanent Representatives (ambassadors), 
Foreign Ministers and Heads of States and Government. The 15 member 
states on the PSC represent the five regions of Africa, and membership ro-
tates, none of the members having a permanent seat or a right of veto. In 
theory, then,  decision-making is efficient, especially as decisions are taken 
by a 2/3 majority rather than by consensus (AU 2004d). 
Other elements of the PSC envisaged by the Peace and Security Council 
Protocol are the Panel of the Wise, a panel of five eminent Africans, the Con-
tinental Early Warning System (CEWS) to warn of impending conflicts, and 
an African Standby Force (ASF) of peacekeepers to intervene when media-
tion fails. The Panel of the Wise will report to the PSC and the Chair of the 
Commission for Peace and Security, as shown in Figure 1. Once fully estab-
Figure 1: Overview of the AU’s peace and security architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) 
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lished, the CEWS will be mandated to analyse data in the Situation Room, 
collected from the Observation and Monitoring Units of the Regional Mecha-
nisms. The data will be based on political, economic, social, military and 
humanitarian indicators. Ultimately, this information will be used to inform 
the PSC’s decisions (AU 2004d). The ASF is important for a security archi-
tecture that includes military options (Klingebiel 2005c). Theoretically, it will 
be developed by 2010 in two phases and will be available for activities rang-
ing from observer missions to peacekeeping or peace- enforcement opera-
tions and post-conflict activities. The force will be composed of five standby 
contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of ori-
gin and ready for rapid deployment (AU 2002b). 
The role of the Commission’s Chairperson, currently Mali’s former President 
Alpha Konaré, has been expanded in the new APSA. The Chairperson, to-
gether with the PSC, advises the AU Assembly on matters relating to peace 
and security. In general, the Commission has an important role to play as the 
AU’s driving force, which also extends to its peace and security architecture. 
Its task is to implement, coordinate and document the PSC’s decisions and to 
forge links with the other relevant departments and their programmes. It is 
also responsible for helping member states to implement specific pro-
grammes and policies, preparing studies and strategies and mobilizing re-
sources for AU financing, including peace and security (ISS 2005a). How-
ever, owing to a lack of capacity, donors supporting the APSA have in fact 
dealt directly with the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD). Links between 
the PSD and other relevant departments have also been weak because of 
capacity bottlenecks.  
Within the Commission, the PSD represents one of the AU’s eight pro-
grammes. While the Directorate’s Conflict Management Centre is responsible 
for conflict prevention, early warning and post-conflict reconstruction, the 
Peace Support Division is in charge of establishing the ASF and ultimately 
deploying peace support operations. The Commission also has a Strategic 
Planning Unit for policy research and formulation, a Resource Mobilisation 
Division and the Darfur Integrated Task Force, which is the strategic plan-
ning unit of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) based in Addis Ababa. 
Finally, the Military Staff Committee – composed of the Chiefs of Defence 
Staff or their representatives (from the countries serving on the PSC) – ad-
vises and assists the Council in all questions relating to military and security 
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requirements (ISS 2005a). Inherited from the OAU is the Peace Fund, a 
mechanism for financing these structures. 
There are other organs relevant to the PSD with which the latter could and 
should liaise. For example, the Political Affairs Department is responsible for 
human rights, transparency and accountability, refugees, the emergence of 
democratic institutions, humanitarian crises and the monitoring of elections 
(Cilliers / Sturman 2004).  
Other organs mentioned in the Protocol establishing the PSC are the Pan-
African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. The Protocol stipulates that these institutions and the PSC are to ex-
change information on matters of peace and security. As regards civil society, 
the PSC is to encourage activities aimed at promoting peace and security. The 
Protocol also states, vaguely, that “when required, such organisations may be 
invited to address the Peace and Security Council”. It remains unclear to 
what extent civil society will be given  a role in the APSA (see the subchapter 
on civil society).  
3.1.1 NEPAD 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, more commonly known as 
NEPAD, addresses the wider aspects of peace and security – governance and 
socio-economic development in Africa – and is not therefore shown in Figure 
1. It was established in 2001, largely owing to the Thabo Mbeki’s vision, but 
was also carried forward by the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Sene-
gal. NEPAD forges the link between security and development by seeing 
them as interdependent elements of a better African future. NEPAD began its 
governance activities in the peace and security context before the AU came 
into being. However, the Maputo Summit in 2003 decided that NEPAD 
should be integrated into the AU after no more than three years (by 2005) if 
the AU was capable of absorbing it as one of its programmes (AU 2003a). 
Although NEPAD is officially regarded as an AU programme (the decision in 
this respect has yet to be implemented politically), NEPAD’s secretariat is 
still located in South Africa and its future has yet to be decided. In these cir-
cumstances, confusion reigns as to who is responsible for post-conflict recon-
struction. A strategy paper on this subject was drawn up by NEPAD in 2003, 
but the AU is currently working on its own, based partly on NEPAD’s paper. 
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The sooner these issues are clarified, the more directed and effective donor 
support for the APSA can be.  
Although there is uncertainty surrounding NEPAD’s future, it has succeeded 
in raising Africa’s profile in the international arena. It has also managed to 
gain support for a partnership approach between donors and Africa which 
emphasises the accountability of both donors and the recipients of their sup-
port.  
The following table gives an overview of the envisaged components of the 
APSA and the stage they have reached in their implementation.  
Table 1: Components of APSA and stages of implementation 
Components of APSA Stages of implementation  
Peace and Security Council  • Operational at all levels (Ambassa-
dor, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Heads of State and Government), i. e. 
regular meetings at all levels 
• Second elections for two-year mem-
bers (10 countries) in 2006, three-
year members due to be newly elec-
ted in 2007 
• Deployment of political and military 
missions (e. g. Sudan, Burundi, Co-
moros, Central African Republic and 
Côte d’Ivoire) 
Continental Early Warning System • Not yet operational, so far no proto-
cols on its establishment 
• Roadmap in process of development 
(March 2006) 
• Situation Room has eight staff  ana-
lysing  conflicts in the continent and 
giving the AU advice 
• Not yet performing intended function 
– one reason being that ECOWAS 
and IGAD are in process of establish-
ing early warning systems 
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Panel of the Wise • Not yet operational, so far no proto-
cols on establishment 
• Roadmap in process of development 
(March 2006) 
African Standby Force  
 
• To be established by 2010 
• Not yet operational, but Concept and 
Roadmap for Operationalisation avail-
able 
• Workshops in 2006 creating basis for 
terms and conditions of future ASF 
deployment (payment, training, com-
mand and control, etc.) and harmo-
nising RECs  
• Planning elements to be established 
at regional and AU level  
Military Staff Committee  • Operational, but does not yet have its 
own offices in Addis Ababa 
• Meets on ad hoc basis to prepare any 
PSC meetings having military com-
ponent 
African Union Commission  • Operational but weak 
• Chairperson plays major role 
• Commissioner for Peace and Security 
plays major role  
• Not coordinating and managing donor 
interaction with the Peace and Secu-
rity Directorate as it should 
Peace and Security Directorate • Operational but weak 
• Peace Support Operations Division 
(PSOD)  developing ASF, but sepa-
rate unit outside PSOD responsible 
for management of AMIS 
• Conflict Management Centre weak, 
few personnel and so far roadmap for 
CEWS and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion 
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3.1.2 Political dynamics  
Although the structures described above are impressive and vast, many ob-
stacles remain before they can function as intended, owing in part to the po-
litical dynamics among member states, the neglect of the civilian components 
of the APSA and the lack of internal financial resources.  
The PSC, which performs the politically most important function in the 
APSA after the Assembly, has shown its political capacity to mandate an 
operation through the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Nevertheless, its reputa-
tion is in danger owing to ongoing debates on its composition. This has cast 
doubt on the extent to which the new political principles of the AU are being 
taken seriously (Klingebiel 2005c). Some of the members have failed to meet 
membership requirements with regard to contributions to peace missions and 
Regional Economic Communities • Close relationship between AU and 
RECs necessary for functioning of 
APSA, e. g. CEWS, ASF 
• Not yet fully established – Memo-
randum of Understanding between 
AU and RECs at draft stage 
Political Affairs Department  • Operational but weak 
• Although responsible for aspects of 
early warning and post-conflict re-
construction, no significant influ-
ence on peace and security architec-
ture and agenda 
ECOSOCC  • ECOSOCC launched in 2005 – not 
yet fully operational  
• One of ten sectoral cluster commit-
tees is Peace and Security  
• Role in APSA yet to be decided; 
depends on whether civil society in-
vited to attend PSC, AU and other 
meetings relevant to peace and secu-
rity in the future 
Source: own compilation 
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“respect for constitutional governance as well as the rule of law and human 
rights” as required by Article 5 of the Protocol establishing the PSC (AU 
2002b). Should the members of the PSC include countries led by dictators or 
with a grave human rights record, the Council could lose credibility and le-
gitimacy at domestic and international level. The same debate is reflected in 
ongoing discussions on whether Sudan should take over the Presidency of the 
AU after Congo Brazzaville’s tenure. At the Khartoum Summit in 2006, it 
was decided to delay Sudan’s Chairmanship until 2007 (AU 2006a).  
3.1.3 Military and civilian components of the APSA 
The area of peace and security within the AU clearly receives the lion’s share 
of donor support. The AU Commission estimates that 90 per cent of donor 
support goes to the PSD rather than the other Directorates. The most dynamic 
developments in this sphere have been in the strengthening of military ca-
pacities, as demonstrated by the AU missions to Burundi and Darfur, the 
workshops on the African Standby Force in 2006, the development of a 
roadmap and the creation of the Peace Support Division, the administrative 
structure for the AU’s military operations. In terms of human capacity and 
conceptual development the AU is advancing more slowly in the areas of 
early warning, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction, all of which are the 
responsibility of the Conflict Management Centre. There is as yet no roadmap 
for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. While the Peace 
Support Division has a permanent staff (albeit numerically small), no perma-
nent position has been created in the Conflict Management Centre for post-
conflict reconstruction.  
Furthermore, civilian components also seem to be neglected within the ASF. 
Although the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the 
Military Staff Committee (AU 2003c) and the Roadmap for the Operationali-
sation of the ASF (AU 2005b) envision integrated missions as the norm, 
peace support operations are still primarily equated with military missions. 
For example, while military aspects are extensively covered in ASF docu-
ments, references to civilian aspects are limited to a few general sentences. In 
addition, the AU and RECs have employed retired military officers to head 
their peace support units, reinforcing the “institutional bias to the military 
aspects of peace operations” (Vogt 2005, 27). The capacity to integrate civil-
ian components into the activities of the Peace Support Operations Division 
(PSOD) is lacking at this stage. Ideally, the PSOD would have civil society 
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put forward a proposal for a framework or roadmap and – as a second step – 
receive donor support for implementation.  
The poor integration of civilian components and broader issues of peace and 
security is also reflected in the tenuous links between the PSOD and the Po-
litical Affairs Department. Theoretically, the Political Affairs Department 
could assist the PSD with the development of the ASF’s civilian component 
and with post-conflict reconstruction issues, as mentioned above. However, 
there is little formalised interaction between the two Directorates. The Politi-
cal Affairs Department received € 2 million from the EU between 2004 and 
2006 to build its capacities and to support human rights, governance and 
election activities. The UN (UNHCR) also provides some support for the 
Political Affairs Department. The amount of assistance is well below what 
the PSOD has received for capacity-building, and yet currently the Political 
Affairs Department cannot absorb more.  
Another problem related to the PSOD’s capacity is that parallel structures 
have been created for peace support operations. While the PSOD was estab-
lished in 2004, the much larger Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was 
created specifically for AMIS. Apart  from the DITF reporting on a weekly 
basis to all AU departments, there was no process of integrating the lessons 
learned by the DITF into the PSOD, although the end of AMIS was already 
in sight. In fact, the DITF is physically located outside AU headquarters, 
making communication even more difficult.  
3.1.4 Financial resources 
The AU’s financial basis is formed by its operative and programme funds. 
The operative annual budget of around US$ 60 million is based on assessed, 
mandatory contributions by member states. In 2005, the AU received only 
US$ 48 million, and the arrears have grown in recent years. Theoretically, the 
programme fund is used to pay for the Commission’s eight programmes and 
is based on voluntary contributions from members, private donors (civil soci-
ety, individuals, private sector) and official donors. In 2005, according to the 
AU Commission, donors provided around 95 per cent, or US$ 80 million, of 
the US$ 95 million needed to finance the AU’s programmes, which shows 
that the fund is in fact heavily donor-dependent. This financial state of affairs 
reflects the AU’s inability generally to finance its activities, including the 
area of peace and security. The Peace Fund, for example, used to cover the 
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costs of the PSC and its supporting organs, and in theory receives 6 per cent 
of the operative fund and voluntary contributions from donors and member 
states. Similar to the operative fund, voluntary funds are almost entirely pro-
vided by donors, and this despite the fact that most funds for AMIS or other 
missions have not flowed through the peace fund.  
Nevertheless, despite obvious dependence on donor contributions, ownership 
of the agenda seems to be located within AU structures. This can be seen in 
the AU’s ability to make political decisions to engage in peace support opera-
tions, which means that it is moving away from the principle of non-
indifference that characterized the OAU. Furthermore, although donors’ in-
terests vary in their support for the APSA, they are so widely scattered as to 
provide financial support for all of the AU’s areas of interest. Even the fact 
that a great deal of donor contributions, especially for AMIS, are paid in kind 
rather than in the form of financial contributions or budget support is wel-
comed by the AU, despite the limits this mode of delivery imposes on the 
AU’s influence (see Chapter 5 for modes of delivery). In-kind contributions 
are viewed favourably as an interim mode of delivery, until the AU has 
strengthened and de-bureaucratised its internal financial and procurement 
systems.  
3.2 Role of the regional economic communities in the 
APSA 
According to the Peace and Security Protocol, the Regional Conflict Mecha-
nisms are “part of the overall security structure” of the AU and therefore play 
an important part in promoting peace, security and stability in Africa (AU 
2002b, 24). While the AU coordinates, monitors and devises policies and acts 
at political level, the RECs are intended to implement at regional level deci-
sions taken at continental level. The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) is supporting a nearly completed process, involving the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, including peace and security 
issues, between the AU Commission and eight RECs: ECOWAS, the Inter-
Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD), the Southern African De-
velopment Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central Afri-
can States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of 
Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). 
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However, this process clashes with the AU’s rationalisation programme, led 
from the Office of the Chairperson, which seeks to convince countries to 
belong to only one of the five RECs representing the AU’s regions.3 The five 
RECs hosting the workshops on the development of the ASF and preparing to 
provide ASF contingents are: ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the northern region. The 
last of these is not yet represented by a unified body but consists rather of a 
conglomeration of countries interested in playing a role in the APSA (the 
main ones being Algeria, Egypt and Libya).  
Once the appropriate RECs have been established, the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) will be responsible for coordinating and harmonizing their 
mechanisms with the AU. The Chairperson of the Commission will convene 
meetings at least once a year to ensure harmonisation and coordination and to 
facilitate exchanges of information between the RECs and the AU. The RECs 
will be invited to PSC meetings to discuss any PSC matters, and the Chair-
person in turn may attend meetings on the Regional Mechanisms. The next 
section compares these RECs and the northern region in terms of a) opera-
tional structures, b) external support and resources, c) peacekeeping experi-
ence and d) political will and dynamics.  
3.2.1 Operational structures  
This subchapter provides an overview of the status of the operational struc-
tures for each of the various RECs with a peace and security mechanism. The 
term “operational structures” thus refers to the establishment of an early 
warning mechanism and standby forces.  
IGAD attaches importance to the implementation of the Conflict Early Warn-
ing and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN), its own early warning 
mechanism, and this is underlined by its establishment of secretariats in Nai-
robi and Addis Ababa. The three staff members who work at CEWARN 
headquarters have been trained in early warning data analysis. Currently, 
cooperation partners are being identified and early warning indicators devel-
oped. The regional early warning units (CEWARUs) have existed since July 
                                                          
3 Nevertheless, at the latest meeting on the rationalisation of the RECs held in Ouagadougou 
in March 2006, the experts advised the retention of the configuration of eight RECs and the 
harmonisation of their policies and programmes.  
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2003, and the 14 staff members report weekly to the CEWARN Unit in Addis 
Ababa. IGAD has been commissioned by the AU to coordinate the estab-
lishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). EASBRIG is 
expected to be ready for deployment by June 2006, its schedule having been 
extended several times. It will comprise 5,500 civilian and military staff (AU 
2005b, 7). 
ECOWAS’s early warning system is not yet operational, but significant pro-
gress has been made. Four regional headquarters have been established in 
Banjul, Lomé, Monrovia and Ouagadougou. Data is collected and analysed 
on a state-by-state and day-by-day basis. However, the activities of the re-
gional headquarters are not yet harmonised, and a uniform concept has still to 
be established (Hettman 2004, 11). ECOWAS is the most advanced of the 
RECs in terms of the operationalisation of standby forces; it is the only REC 
to have an operational standby force that has been deployed in peace opera-
tions.  
The SADC’s early warning system and the South Africa Standby Brigade 
(SOUTHBRIG) have not yet been put in place. Given the financial weak-
nesses, it is very hard to envisage a peacekeeping force by the year 2010 or 
2015, as outlined in the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). Yet 
the reopening of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) 
in Harare is an encouraging sign for the SADC’s military plans. 
Since 1994, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) has been dormant at the level 
of the Heads of State, the organisation’s highest decision-making and policy-
guiding body, because of political tensions among the member countries. The 
AMU does not yet have an operational standby force. Nevertheless, some 
North African countries are willing to form a North Africa Standby Force 
(NORTHBRIG), and they have peacekeeping experience in UN and AU 
missions. Algeria, for example, has sent troops to the Sudan, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Liberia, while Egypt has been active in 
Sudan and Burundi.  
In 2002, ECCAS set up a peace and security mechanism known as the Coun-
cil for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) to promote, maintain 
and consolidate peace and security in the region. It calls for the creation of an 
Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa (MARAC) to collect and ana-
lyse data for the prevention and detection of crises. The protocol calls for the 
creation of a Central African multinational force (FOMAC) to assist in the 
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event of humanitarian crises, serious threats to peace and security in the re-
gion and unconstitutional changes of government. However, MARAC and 
FOMAC have yet to be established. 
3.2.2 External support for the RECs and their resources  
External support 
The budgets of all the Regional Economic Communities are financed by 
annual assessed contributions from member states and assistance from other 
sources. Programmes and projects are funded from grants, other financial 
contributions and technical assistance from development partners and multi-
lateral agencies. External contributions account for a significant share of 
overall budgets.  
IGAD and ECOWAS in particular benefit from support from external donors. 
This is due to their comparatively strong engagement and progress in peace- 
and security-related issues. Donor support for IGAD primarily comes from 
the European Union, followed by the USA and Italy. CEWARN is supported 
by Germany, the USA, the UK and Canada. EASBRIG is mainly supported 
by the UK.  
The principal sources of donor support for ECOWAS are the European Union 
and France. France financed the entire ECOMOG mission to Guinea Bissau 
(Juma / Mengistu 2002, 30). Other contributors to ECOWAS are the UK, 
Canada, the USA, Denmark and Germany. 
The SADC has found it more difficult to obtain external support to imple-
ment structures because of the mounting pressure on it to react to events in 
Zimbabwe. The USA, for example, offered to provide US$ 20 million for 
some aspects of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) – the 
SADC’s security mechanism – on condition that it marginalised Zimbabwe, 
but the SADC refused (Fisher / Ngoma 2005). Similarly, Canadian financial 
support has decreased. Germany provides the SADC with advisory services 
through the GTZ. 
ECCAS is mainly supported by France through its Reinforcement of African 
Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP V) programme. The exercise is to be 
carried out in partnership with ECCAS, the AU and the EU and is scheduled 
for 2005–2006.  
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The USA is the principal partner of the five ASF workshops with 
NORTHBRIGS that take place in Cairo. 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC and 
ECCAS receive limited support. Germany is currently evaluating the option 
of supporting ECCAS in the future.  
The RECs’ own resources 
The RECs’ capacities for generating their own resources are generally weak. 
This is partly due to member states’ inability to pay and to bad payment mo-
rale.  Inefficiency in obtaining external donations further complicates the 
situation.  
Some of the RECs count on regional powers to pay the lion’s share of all 
member states’ contributions because they are the most powerful economies 
in the region. Examples are South Africa in the SADC and Nigeria in 
ECOWAS.  
3.2.3 Peacekeeping experience 
The AU has commissioned five RECs to establish regional standby forces 
that will be the pillars of the African Union’s planned African Standby Force 
(ASF). Officially, the regional ASF brigades will be provided by ECOWAS, 
IGAD, SADC, ECCAS and AMU Common Defence and Security Policy. 
However, since the AMU is not active in peace and security matters, a few 
countries of the northern region have decided to participate. The establish-
ment of the ASF will take place in two phases and be completed by the year 
2010. It will be available for a variety of activities ranging from observer 
missions to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and post-conflict 
activities. The troops will be deployed under an AU mandate and placed 
under AU or UN operational control, as appropriate (AU 2005b).  
However, current peacekeeping experience differs widely among the Re-
gional Economic Communities. Whereas ECOWAS can already draw on an 
operational standby force, others have not even established the structures for 
deployments. In some of the regions, member states have gained experience 
of peacekeeping by deploying their troops in AU or UN missions. Of the five 
RECs, only ECOWAS and the SADC have peacekeeping experience at re-
gional level.  
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In terms of peace operations, ECOWAS is by far the most experienced, re-
sourced and knowledgeable regional organisation (Vogt 2005, 28). ECOMOG, 
the ECOWAS ceasefire Monitoring Group, has so far been engaged in sev-
eral peacekeeping activities and has deployed up to 15,000 troops (Sierra 
Leone and Liberia 1999) (ISS 2005d). Its activities include peacekeeping 
operations (Côte d’Ivoire 2002–2004 and Liberia 2003), as well as the de-
ployment of policemen (Guinea Bissau 1998-2003) and election monitoring 
(Liberia 1997). In 2002, the Defence and Security Commission approved a 
harmonised training program for ECOMOG’s standby units at three training 
schools in the region. The setting up of two military bases for the storage of 
common user equipment is also planned (ISS 2005d). 
The ECCAS multinational force for Central Africa (FOMAC) participated in 
a military mission to the Central African Republic in 2002/2003 with assis-
tance from France. However, its deployment capacity was limited (Powell 
2005, 63).   
3.2.4 Political will and dynamics 
The relationship among ordinary member countries and the presence or ab-
sence of leading powers in regional organisations play a large part in deter-
mining the ability of the regions to react to or prevent conflict situations. In 
particular, the low contributions made by most members of all five RECs is 
seen as a sign of a lack of political will rather than a lack of capacity.  
Owing to its economic power4 and military capacities, Nigeria appears to be 
the unchallenged regional power within ECOWAS. Nigeria assumes military 
responsibilities by providing the largest troop contingent and is in command 
of the majority of ECOMOG missions. It assumed the operational lead of the 
ECOMOG mission in Liberia in 1990 and financed 90 per cent of the costs or 
around US$ 1.2 billion (Juma, Mengistu 2002, 30). Nigeria also provided the 
bulk of the troops for the ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone in 1997. Its 
dominance is further evident from the fact that 35 of the 115 members of the 
ECOWAS parliament are Nigerians. Nevertheless, Nigerian President 
Obasanjo has made it clear that Nigeria cannot continue providing the lion’s 
share of ECOMOG forces in the future (ISS 2005d).  
                                                          
4 Nigeria has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$ 125,7 billion, roughly equivalent to 
41 per cent of the combined GDP of all ECOWAS member states. 
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Similarly, South Africa provides the lion’s share of the SADC’s budget and 
supplies most of the troops for missions in and outside the SADC. Although, 
on paper, the SADC has created the structures needed to manage and solve 
conflicts, rivalries and tensions among its member states have hampered the 
development of a formalised security mechanism. This has meant that con-
flict management activities have relied on ad hoc alliances and mediation 
efforts (Petretto 2005, 60). At the same time, donors are no longer willing to 
support the SADC financially because of Zimbabwe, and this extends to the 
Regional Peacekeeping Centre, which is based in Harare. This is fatal for any 
regional economic organisation, since the development of conflict manage-
ment capacities largely depends on external contributions.  
Within IGAD there is no clear leader, although Ethiopia has tried to assume 
that position by contributing some troops to AU peace support operations and 
paying US$ 100,000 in voluntary contributions into the AU’s programme 
budget, making it one of only three countries to do so, the others being South 
Africa and Nigeria. However, Ethiopia is simply too weak economically and 
too discredited by recent internal political events to adopt a leadership role. 
IGAD also suffers more from the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea than it 
gains from Ethiopia’s support, since it complicates decision-making on many 
issues. The tensions between Sudan and Somalia have similarly hampered 
decision-making at regional level. Kenya has attempted to take on a coordi-
nating role, since it is active in the process between Sudan and Somalia and 
has shown its willingness to become involved by sending 35 military observ-
ers and 25 civilian police to AMIS.  
As ECCAS is at the stage of implementing its strategies, little can be said 
about how politics affects the region’s peace and security agenda.  
Some countries of the northern region have signalled their interest in support-
ing the APSA. Algeria, for example, now hosts the International Center 
Against Terrorism, which will invariably link it to sub-Saharan Africa, since 
the Center will serve as a data collection hub. The northern region is also 
hosting one of five ASF workshops together with the USA as the lead part-
ner.  
3.2.5 Assessment 
There is no doubt that regional structures are needed to stabilise relations, 
prevent the spill-over of conflicts and secure emerging common values. 
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ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD are the main regional organisations engaged in 
the management and prevention of conflicts. All three are involved in media-
tion and conflict resolution activities, with IGAD and ECOWAS also en-
gaged in conflict prevention. In terms of peace operations, ECOWAS is by 
far the most experienced and active subregional organisation. However, as 
even these relatively advanced RECs have no effective crisis response struc-
tures, peace enforcement continues to be ad hoc and mostly driven by the 
interests of the strongest in the region (DFID / FCO / MoD 2001, 19). 
3.3 Regional powers 
The concept of regional powers 
African leadership and regional powers play an important role in the new 
African peace and security architecture. The transformation of the OAU into 
the AU resulted from a grand idea mooted by Libya. While the origin of the 
substance injected into the operationalisation process remains contested, there 
is little doubt that the process has largely been led by South Africa and Nige-
ria. And again, the implementation of the ambitious peace and security agen-
da at continental level through the AU and at regional level through the RECs 
largely depends on the political will and active engagement of what are 
known as regional powers. 
In our conception, what makes a country a regional power is the combination 
of a certain economic supremacy, a government with financial and human 
capacities and a strong, influential leader. Besides being the driving forces 
behind regional developments, these countries often have a continental influ-
ence and are behind initiatives at pan-African level. 
3.3.1 More constructive and less constructive African states 
The paradigm shift in the AU from the principle of non-intervention to “the 
right to intervene” (AU 2000, Article 4) is due to African leaders – suppos-
edly the often proclaimed new generation of leaders – who have succeeded in 
pushing a new way of thinking on to the African agenda. Even though the 
real picture negates much of this optimism, a distinction can be made be-
tween more constructive and less constructive African states in relation to the 
enhancement of the African peace and security agenda. 
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Widely perceived as drivers of the pan-African cause are not only South 
Africa and Nigeria, but also Algeria, Senegal and Egypt; Ghana, Botswana, 
Mozambique and Tanzania are also seen as keen supporters. Standing on the 
other side are Zimbabwe as well as Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso and 
Swaziland, who are reluctant to see the African Union flourish and are op-
posed to potential interventions in their internal affairs. Their resistance to 
democratic change and democratic principles, such as the rule of law and 
civil society participation, “might be attractive to old-style African leaders 
who resist change and who continue clinging to power” (Schoeman 2003, 5). 
The role played by Libya, often bluntly accused of being driven by Gaddafi’s 
“chequebook diplomacy”, is very ambiguous. Through President Gaddafi 
Libya can be considered a great proponent of integration in Africa, although 
his grand pan-African ideas are often transformed into more practical and 
realisable compromises. 
Yet the new peace and security architecture in general, and the AU in particu-
lar, is dependent on the engagement of influential leaders or powerful coun-
tries. It is South Africa, Nigeria and Libya that play crucial roles in political 
mediation, peacekeeping and the allocation of financial resources. Together 
with Egypt and Algeria, they contribute 75 per cent of the AU’s operational 
budget, for example. Funding the building of the AU is putting a strain on the 
member states, especially the regional powers. As the same states are also 
playing leadership roles in their regions, they are also the ones in many cases 
that fund activities implemented through the RECs, examples being Nigeria 
in ECOWAS and South Africa in the SADC (Schoeman 2003, 10).  
Besides the economic aspect of this commitment, the leading countries pro-
vide intellectual power and technical expertise. They are also the real inter-
locutors. International actors and donors work with and through those re-
gional powers, since the credibility of NEPAD and of the AU is based on 
their constructive engagement. As an example, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya 
and (surprisingly) Ethiopia are “anchors” of US engagement with the conti-
nent (Taylor / Williams 2004, 10). The European Union’s new Strategy for 
Africa similarly takes account of Africa’s regional powers, recognizing them 
as anchor countries – “poles of attraction and economic and political driving 
forces for their neighbours”. Nigeria and South Africa are mentioned as lead-
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ing examples.5 “Due to the size of their economies and their commitment to 
regional and continental integration, they play a central role in economic 
development and political stability across Africa. Politically, the leaders of 
these two countries, former President Obasanjo and President Mbeki, have 
taken on the roles of peace brokers, often far beyond their own sub-regions” 
(EU 2005d, 11). 
3.3.2 South Africa’s contribution to the APSA 
South Africa, being the leading economic, political and military power, is 
Africa’s interlocutor with major foreign powers (Hughes 2004). In its new 
Africa strategy the EU acknowledges South Africa’s role as an anchor coun-
try and as a key actor for regional stability and integration: “On the continen-
tal level, South Africa is one of the driving forces behind the AU and NEPAD, 
a beacon of democracy and good governance and a major peace-keeper. On 
a global scale, it plays an increasingly important role as a representative of 
Africa and the entire developing world” (EU 2005d, 20 f.). Pillars of South 
Africa’s foreign policy are partnership with the developing world and a 
bridging role between South and North (Landsberg 2005, 751). 
Within a decade South Africa has transformed itself from being an isolated 
and boycotted pariah state under apartheid to one of the globally most active, 
open and connected countries in the world. While Nelson Mandela’s central 
role is acknowledged, much of this rehabilitation can be credited to President 
Thabo Mbeki. His further ambition has been to “persuade Africa to set up its 
own institutions and mechanisms for solving its problems, thus ending the 
constant, humiliating requests for aid to the West’s former colonial powers” 
(Economist 2006). 
Hence, in the African context, South Africa is a driving force of integration 
and pan-African development. President Thabo Mbeki is central to South 
Africa’s foreign policy; his vision of an African renaissance drives the coun-
try’s national interest in building an African peace and security architecture. 
The development of the African Union is at the heart of Mbeki’s policy in the 
continent, and NEPAD is his pet project; both initiatives bear his signature 
(Schmidt 2005, 30 f.). In addition, South Africa hosts the NEPAD headquar-
                                                          
5  The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development also regards Nigeria 
and South Africa as anchor countries. 
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ters and the AU’s Pan-African Parliament. As it chairs the SADC’s security 
organ, its priorities are clearly to build African potential for conflict man-
agement and peacekeeping in Africa. At sub-regional level, this translates 
into the establishment of an early warning system and an SADC peacekeep-
ing standby brigade (Schmidt 2005, 30 f.). 
Peacekeeping has become central to South Africa’s foreign and defence pol-
icy. South African troops have been sent to the DR Congo and Burundi (first 
under the AU’s command, then under the UN’s), and currently troops are also 
stationed in Darfur and in the Comoros under an AU mandate. In these cases, 
South Africa has the financial resources to fund its own troops and is not 
dependent on meagre funds from the AU. It has also been very active in con-
flict resolution and mediation, especially in the Great Lakes region and in 
Rwanda, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and, lately, Sudan. Another core concern is 
post-conflict reconstruction, which has led to the development of post-
conflict units in South Africa’s ministries. South Africa also engages in trilat-
eral cooperation, where it joins with other donors from the North in providing 
assistance in an African state – as, for example, in the DRC, where it is coop-
erating with European states in post-conflict reconstruction. Yet South Africa 
still seems unfamiliar with its new donor role. There is also a lively debate in 
the country about the limits to its continental involvement. 
3.3.3 South Africa’s role in the African continent –  
hegemonic obligations? 
South Africa’s regional role is yet not clear-cut, its foreign policy even being 
described as schizophrenic. “Its advocacy for NEPAD and stance in the AU, 
its drive to host the Pan-African Parliament and its bid for a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council demonstrate its eagerness to play this [regional] 
role” (Habib / Selinyane 2007). Although South Africa shows willingness to 
play a pivotal regional role and its ability to assume leadership in Africa, it 
consciously refrains from taking a visible lead and hides behind multilateral-
ism, emphasising the country’s importance, but not its dominant position in 
the region. Its schizophrenic characteristics are illustrated by the following 
examples. On the one hand, South Africa has demonstrated hegemonic be-
haviour by intervening in Lesotho. On the other hand, Pretoria has turned a 
blind eye to breakdowns of law and order in such close neighbours as Zim-
babwe and Swaziland and has been reluctant actively to encourage the link-
ing of moral standards to South African investments in the continent. “[Pre-
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toria’s] discharge of its regional role has been a variegated tapestry of hesi-
tance and enthusiasm” (Habib / Selinyane 2007). 
South Africa is very careful not to be perceived as a hegemonic power. Its 
government is reluctant to assume too prominent, too strong a leadership role 
in the AU, fearing rejection and accusations of hegemonic tendencies and of 
being in the pay of the West or international financial institutions (Schoeman 
2003, 9). Some African states are displaying growing resentment of what 
they perceive as South African domination of African affairs and the aggres-
sive expansion strategy of South African companies throughout the continent 
(Mehler / Melber / van Walraven 2005, 458). South African investment has 
exploded in Africa, but social ethics are known to be very low. Consequently, 
the South African government is being increasingly urged to force its corpo-
rate sector to adopt higher moral standards. The suspicions of other African 
states, South Africa’s legacy of apartheid and its recent independence leave 
Pretoria a role in the continent that has yet to be defined.  
As Thabo Mbeki has often said, South Africa’s fate is linked to the rest of 
Africa, since its welfare depends on politico-economic developments and on 
peace and stability in the continent, as does its vision of an African renais-
sance. It is in South Africa’s own interest to promote peace and security at 
continental level, since its economic growth depends on Africa’s develop-
ment, which in turn requires peace and security. This is also in the interest of 
the African continent, since South Africa’s active involvement in conflict 
resolution and peacekeeping has helped to foster stability and democracy. 
Some regions and countries in crisis avoided by Pretoria seem unable to 
break the spiral of conflict and instability. Stability in Africa, and conse-
quently development and democracy, can be achieved only with the influence 
and power of a regional hegemon (Habib / Selinyane 2007). Because of these 
considerations and “as an economic and military power, South Africa must 
play an unambiguously hegemonic role” (Habib/ Selinyane 2007). This 
means not only being a pivotal state, but also accepting the role of continental 
leadership. 
3.3.4 Nigeria: a second potential African power? 
Expectations of South Africa’s leading role in the continent have been high, 
but are also “accompanied by fear of potential abuse of South Africa’s domi-
nance” (Habib / Selanyane 2007). The major concern about hegemonic power 
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being abused can best be allayed by the existence of a counter-power. For the 
time being, this role is best played by Nigeria. Even though Nigeria has nei-
ther the economic nor the military power of South Africa, it has been more 
decisive in leading political and military initiatives to stabilise West Africa, 
including the sending of troops to peacekeeping missions (Habib / Selinyane 
2007). It is almost impossible to imagine peace and security in West Africa 
without Nigeria’s participation. The country contributes more troops to 
ECOMOG for peace support missions than other members of ECOWAS. 
Currently, Nigeria is also the largest troop contributor to AMIS.  
Given its experience of peacekeeping in the continent and its role within 
ECOWAS, Nigeria is an important partner when it comes to peace and secu-
rity in Africa. It also plays an active role at political level in Africa. It has 
done so in the resolution of the crises in Sierra Leone and Liberia and is cur-
rently hosting talks aimed at resolving the Darfur crisis. Besides this, former 
Nigerian President Obasanjo was until recently AU chairman and head of the 
Peace and Security Council. At international level he is the new chairman of 
the Commonwealth and is regularly invited to international conferences and 
summits (Mehler / Melber / van Walraven 2005, 143). 
Consequently, Nigeria is a second potential power in the African continent. 
The existence of a counter-power would help South Africa to focus its think-
ing and to take on the role of regional power in the first place. Furthermore, a 
strong Nigeria would prompt South Africa to behave in systematically bene-
ficial ways for the continent (Habib / Selinyane 2007). The obvious competi-
tion between Nigeria and South Africa in supporting the African peace and 
security architecture – Nigeria literally financing the AU building, South 
Africa responding by providing the furniture – has resulted in dynamics being 
added and a balance within the African Union being guaranteed. At the same 
time, Nigeria and South Africa are strategic partners – which does not con-
flict with the concept of a power and a counter-power – in advancing the pan-
African cause in their role as continental leaders. 
3.3.5 Competition for continental leadership 
It comes as no surprise that other potential regional powers, too, are compet-
ing for continental leadership and for influence in conflict resolution and 
management across Africa. In East Africa, Kenya continues to provide much 
needed support for peace initiatives. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
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Agreement (CPA) by the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese Peo-
ple’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLMA) in early 2005 followed years of 
relentless mediation by Kenya. Recently, Kenya has hosted a transitional 
government of Somalia in Nairobi as part of the efforts to reintroduce politi-
cal normality to a country that has lived without a government for more than 
fifteen years.  
Competition for continental leadership became most evident recently, when 
Africa was lobbying for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. South 
Africa was “ready to represent the continent”; Nigeria felt “qualified” to take 
on the task; Egypt meant to “represent Africa”, and Senegal tried to introduce 
a francophone alternative into the debate. Competitive behaviour is also 
common within the African Union. Even though Kenya clearly plays an im-
portant role in East Africa, like Ghana and Senegal in West Africa and, to 
some extent, Libya and Algeria in the North, it is Nigeria and South Africa 
that are perceived as continental leaders. 
3.3.6 Conclusions 
In summary, the regional powers – often in the person of their leaders – are 
clearly driving forces behind the new reform dynamics in Africa. Even 
though it is hard to identify obvious spoilers, there are certainly some less 
constructive African states hampering the integration process promoted by 
the African Union. While the principle of equality of membership in the AU 
should not be downplayed, it is an open secret that such pivotal states as 
Libya, Nigeria and South Africa play a preponderant role in influencing the 
AU’s peace and security agenda. Against this background, it would not be an 
overstatement to suggest that the AU’s peace and security architecture would 
not exist without the support of these key African states. The claim of “own-
ership” and of “African solutions to African problems” gains credibility 
through the clearly visible engagement of internationally recognised leaders, 
such as head of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, former Nigerian 
President Olusegun Obasanjo and South African President Thabo Mbeki. 
Although the grand aims set out in AU and NEPAD documents, such as in-
tervention in the name of human rights and the African Peer Review Mecha-
nism, are gradually being achieved, the international community is impatient 
to see more rigorous action. The aspect of politics and political will hovers 
over all the AU’s activities, and the implementation of its ambitious agenda 
depends on the African leaders (Schoeman 2003, 8). Regional powers can 
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also exercise their influence to further the RECs – representing integrative 
parts of the peace and security architecture – as pillars of the African Union. 
The pan-African vision and the impressive aim of continent-wide peace, 
followed by stability and democracy, requires not only political will but, even 
more importantly, strong leadership. South Africa’s foreign policy may not 
appear consistent and homogeneous, but it has led the way most unambigu-
ously in the building of continental institutions for African integration and for 
peace and security. Pretoria is known to lead from behind, enthusiastically or 
hesitantly. In strategic partnership and dynamic rivalry with Nigeria and other 
potential regional powers, South Africa is crucial for the implementation and 
advancement of the African peace and security architecture. 
3.4 Civil society 
Civil society forms part of the African peace and security architecture in two 
ways. Firstly, certain civil society organisations (CSOs) form a valuable pillar 
of the APSA, directly promoting the continental peace and security agenda, 
through their research, policy advice and related activities, for example. Sec-
ondly, civil society in general has an official role to play in the structure of 
the APSA, namely within the African Union. What is meant is not their 
watchdog function of monitoring the intergovernmental institutions but rather 
their representation on the Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
(ECOSOCC) – the AU’s civil society body. 
Civil society organisations that form part of the APSA through their active 
engagement in peace and security at continental level are limited in number. 
This small group of organisations with a peace and security profile include 
independent policy think-tanks and professional NGOs, such as the Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS) and Safer Africa in Pretoria, the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, the African Centre for the Constructive Reso-
lution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban, the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
(CCR) in Cape Town, the African Peace Forum (APF) in Nairobi, the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg, the Insti-
tute for Global Dialogue (IGD) in Midrand and the African Human Security 
Initiative (AHSI), a cross-border network. 
These CSOs have been referred to as the intellectual driving force of the 
APSA, if only because they facilitate discussions and meetings on peace and 
security in Africa. Although their roles and functions within the APSA may 
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differ and overlap, different models of involvement have been considered 
central: policy advice “in the tent” and “out of the tent” and such implement-
ing functions as mediation and training.  
3.4.1 Policy advice  
Their role as policy advisors puts CSOs in the position of experts. Better 
staffed and equipped to conduct in-depth studies and analysis, research insti-
tutions, think-tanks and, increasingly, universities are able to collect and offer 
the knowledge and expertise that is lacking within the AU and government 
structures. Policy advice is mainly provided on request and often in close 
cooperation with the APSA institutions, especially the AU. Cooperation with 
and work for the AU may, however, take different forms – “in the tent” or 
“out of the tent” – and clear distinctions cannot be made. 
“In the tent”: “In the tent” describes direct access to the ‘multilateral tent’, 
which is the African Union. In this position, CSOs are admitted to the AU’s 
negotiating table and so help to formulate and draft policies and protocols. 
Belonging to the inner circle clearly has the advantage of giving them an 
insider’s view and influence in policy formulation, but they are expected to 
subscribe to a strict code of confidentiality. A disadvantage could be the lack 
of distance and consequently the limited possibility of voicing criticism. A 
CSO’s decision to position itself “in the tent“ can be interpreted as a change 
of self-perception, independence from governmental institutions being fun-
damental for most CSOs. 
“Out of the tent”: Being “out of the tent”, on the other hand, means working 
outside the AU structures. Such work also includes policy advice and formu-
lation, but also permits general analysis and in-depth research, since a posi-
tion “out of the tent” enables a critical distance from the AU and the APSA to 
be maintained. As such CSOs are not bound by confidentiality, they can en-
gage in open discussions and make statements to the media. 
3.4.2 Implementation 
Implementation of the peace and security agenda is a broad term, which may 
include everything from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction on 
the ground. In this regard, certain CSOs have engaged in mediation and train-
ing in conflict resolution and peacekeeping at continental level, while CSOs 
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working in post-conflict situations are almost all local NGOs, many created 
on an ad-hoc basis. 
Mediation 
Besides diplomatic efforts by African heads of state and international person-
alities, civil society organisations, too, can take on a role as credible media-
tors in the prevention or resolution of conflicts. The Centre for Conflict Reso-
lution (CCR) is still rather exceptional in this regard. Since its foundation in 
1968, it has developed expertise and an international reputation for policy 
advice, training and, above all, mediation. Capacity-building for conflict 
resolution and management forms the focus of the CCR’s approach and is 
carried out by means of training, technical assistance, policy development 
and research, academic programmes and outreach. 
Training for Peace 
Training in peacebuilding, conflict resolution and transformation are increas-
ingly offered at local and national level through CSOs. At continental level, 
Training for Peace is a joint initiative between ACCORD, the Norwegian 
Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), ISS and the Kofi Annan Interna-
tional Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). Within this framework 
ACCORD provides civilian training and the ISS police training, while  the 
KAIPTC serves as a host for both types of training in the West. 
Almost all the think-tanks mentioned above are situated in South Africa. 
While Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria are experiencing a vibrant civil society 
movement today, it is South Africa’s open and transparent political structure 
and infrastructure that allow civil society to flourish. Moreover, civil society 
in South Africa has the resources to look at such broader issues as peace and 
security, while their counterparts in less developed African countries are 
more concerned with internal problems at grassroots level. These favourable 
conditions are essentially due to the support of an interested international 
community concentrating its efforts on the young democracy of South Africa. 
As a consequence, South Africa hosts the top civil society organisations in 
Africa in terms of range of competences, professionalism and research ca-
pacities. 
At the same time, the CSOs referred to above are continental in nature – often 
with staff from all over Africa and offices in such strategic locations as Addis 
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Ababa and Nairobi. In addition, they adopt a regional approach in their work, 
but target peace and security issues at continental level. 
As for civil society in general – which includes in this context grassroots 
organisations, advocacy groups, think-tanks and other non-governmental 
non-profit organisations – its potential for the APSA has yet to be discovered. 
So far no open participation of CSOs has accompanied the evolution of the 
peace and security architecture in general or the development process of the 
African Union in particular. For one thing, the building of the APSA, mainly 
by the AU, has been an intergovernmental process. “Africa – particularly its 
political leadership – is still in the habit of trying to design and implement a 
fully-fledged organisation in a top-down fashion giving little opportunity for 
any bottom-up process” (Schoeman 2003, 8). Furthermore, peace and secu-
rity forms part of the foreign policy sphere, which is still tightly controlled by 
governments.  
What is more, civil society in Africa is struggling with basic challenges. First 
of all, there is the lack of trust between CSOs and governments. Governments 
are often reluctant to recognise CSOs as valuable experts and consultants, but 
rather see them apprehensively as watchdogs. A second and closely related 
factor is that there is a lack of space for civil society. Hardly any govern-
ments in Africa support civil society or even allow it to develop. Thirdly, 
human capacity is simply lacking, as many people leave their restricted coun-
tries if they have not been recruited by international organisations or donor 
agencies. A chronic problem is, fourthly, the lack of funding. As CSOs are 
seldom supported by governments financially, they are dependent on foreign 
donors. 
Nevertheless, the African Union’s Constitutive Act gives considerable 
prominence to civil society’s role in the AU’s activities (Schoeman 2003, 
16). Articles 5 and 22 set the stage for the Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council (ECOSOCC) as “an advisory organ composed of different social and 
professional groups of the Member States of the Union” (AU 2000, Article 
22) in order to guarantee legitimate representation and incorporation of civil 
society. In practical terms, ECOSOCC gives civil society organisations and 
other stakeholders an opportunity to establish formal relations with the Afri-
can Union and to participate in its initiatives (Murithi 2005). The organ’s 
objectives, composition and functions are described in the ECOSOCC Stat-
utes, which were proposed in June 2004 by the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (PRC) and adopted by the Assembly. As key operational mecha-
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nisms, CSOs are grouped in Sectoral Cluster Committees. The first of the ten 
such committees is known as Peace and Security and comprises CSOs con-
cerned with “conflict anticipation, prevention, management and resolution, 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, prevention and combating of 
terrorism, use of child soldiers, drug trafficking, illicit proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons and security reform, etc.” (ECOSOCC, Article 11). 
ECOSOCC is in place, and civil society has been given a voice in the African 
Union and so within a central pillar of the APSA – but that voice has yet to 
be heard. ECOSOCC has been of little importance so far, if only because of 
its limited transparency and inadequate organisation. Put simply, ECOSOCC 
has been launched, but is not yet operational. When it comes to peace and 
security per se, the AU continues to be rather vague about the participation of 
civil society. According to the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) – the framework rules governing the peace and security architecture – 
civil society organisations “may be invited to address the Peace and Security 
Council.”6 But it is too early to judge how open the PSC is to think-tanks and 
other NGOs, as it is still at a formatting stage and has not yet invited civil 
society organisations to address it.  
All the same, “the AU is and remains an inter-state or inter-governmental 
organisation – and it would seem that such organisations will be involved in 
the AU and in ECOSOCC in particular under duress of their governments” 
(Schoeman 2003, 16). Nevertheless, the AU’s commitment to engage civil 
society in its work is clearly reflected in the creation of ECOSOCC and the 
establishment of the Pan-African Parliament. If this commitment is sincere, 
civil society and thus the member states will play an important part in the 
African peace and security architecture. Ideally, the AU will increasingly 
draw on their expertise and advice in a range of issues, including peace and 
security. In the meantime, civil society will struggle with a lack of capacities, 
resources and government trust. 
                                                          
6 Article 20 of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the AU, Relations with Civil Society Organizations, reads: “The Peace and Se-
curity Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-based and 
other civil society organizations, particularly women’s organizations, to participate ac-
tively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When re-
quired, such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.”   
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Opinions differ widely over the role that civil society should, can and does 
play in the African peace and security architecture. In general, greater in-
volvement of Africa’s civil society is important for peace and stability in the 
continent, “particularly since governance is often weak, corruption endemic 
and democracy in a number of countries little more than a façade” (Cilliers 
2003). Observing developments in the civil society scene, CSOs – especially 
existing think-tanks – can have a growing influence in the African peace and 
security architecture. Even though fewer than a dozen civil society organisa-
tions are actively engaged with the African peace and security agenda and in 
the African peace and security architecture, most of them located in South 
Africa, their expertise and work as policy advisors, mediators and implemen-
ters is highly valuable for the APSA and indispensable for the African Union 
and its member governments. 
3.5 Conclusions and challenges 
The African Union has taken impressive political and institutional steps to 
transform itself into a credible, major actor for peace and security in Africa. 
Where these political and institutional dynamics are concerned, much has 
been achieved in various fields relating to political will, the building of long-
term institutional capacities and willingness to act. 
Firstly, political will is essential if the peace and security situation in the 
continent is to change. One significant example of the progressive political 
dynamics has been the AU’s Constitutive Act. The conscious decision to 
move from the principle of sovereignty to the right of intervention lies at the 
heart of the overall dynamics in the field of peace and security. Yet African 
countries, civil society organisations and regional powers as well as the AU 
Commission and the external community that support these changes must 
maintain this new and still fragile momentum at all times if it is not to cease.  
Secondly, many activities are helping to build long-term capacities to ensure 
that peace and security in Africa are protected by African solutions. The 
process of setting up the African Standby Force (ASF) is a striking example. 
The holding of regional workshops with the aim of establishing comparable 
forces throughout the continent and the operational progress that has been 
made in the regions are major accomplishments in this regard. 
Lastly, the political dynamics have not been confined to resolutions and 
speeches: willingness to act is another achievement. AMIS and the AU Mis-
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sion in Burundi (AMIB) are important examples. The decisions to intervene 
and the deployment of troops on the ground have shown that the transition 
from OAU to AU has been marked not by a superficial change of words but 
by a profound change of action. 
Despite the promising developments in the area of peace and security in Af-
rica, the AU’s success depends on whether it manages to establish fully op-
erational institutions for peace and security. Many challenges lie ahead on 
this path to a satisfactorily functioning African peace and security architec-
ture capable of preventing and solving conflicts efficiently and also of suc-
cessfully engaging in post-conflict reconstruction. Donors, civil society and 
member states play an important role in this respect. 
The AU faces three serious capacity bottlenecks relating to human, financial 
and infrastructure capacities. Firstly, human capacity is limited in the areas of 
planning and, on the ground, mediation and military intervention. The AU’s 
PSD is still not fully staffed. By the spring of 2006, for example, no staff had 
been employed for the area of post-conflict reconstruction. One reason for the 
delayed deployment of AMIS was said to be the African Union’s weak plan-
ning capacity (Powell 2005). A lack of command and control was also identi-
fied during the mission (Schümer 2004). The establishment of the DITF has 
been an important step in tackling this bottleneck. However, it created new 
problems owing to its establishment outside the AU’s Peace Support Opera-
tions Division. It will be a major task to integrate lessons learned and capaci-
ties built into the regular AU structures. Another bottleneck in the human 
capacity sphere concerns mediators. While senior envoys of the AU have 
been highly effective at mediating in conflict situations, junior and mid-level 
mediators often lack mediation, administrative or managerial skills (Cooke 
2005). The AMIS troops on the ground have also lacked the capacity to carry 
out the complex tasks assigned to them (Powell 2005), and interoperability 
has been limited. The lack of sufficient adequately trained personnel is in part 
due to low remuneration levels, especially in comparison to other interna-
tional organisations, and also to high rates of HIV/AIDS infection (Schümer 
2004). AU bureaucracy has been another important factor. 
Secondly, the Peace Fund’s financial capacities are almost non-existent on 
the African side. The African Union cannot even collect sufficient funds for 
its basic budget. In 2005, incoming payments from member states accounted 
for only US$ 48 million of the operative  budget of US$ 63 million. The 
programme budget of US$ 90 million is almost completely donor-funded. 
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Only Nigeria and South Africa made substantial payments – of US$ 10 and 
US$ 11 million respectively – to the 2005 programme budget. The lack of 
financial capabilities becomes obvious when these contributions are com-
pared to the cost of AMIS. From 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 alone, the cost 
of AMIS was budgeted at US$ 466 million. Besides the lack of financial 
resources, the AU’s budget and procurement systems lack credibility. The 
findings of a fiduciary assessment commissioned by the EU in spring 2006 
has revealed considerable weaknesses.  
Thirdly, infrastructure capacity is lacking both for routine procedures and 
military deployments. These problems encompass logistics, communications 
and intelligence (Schümer 2004). A striking example of an infrastructure 
capacity bottleneck has been the inability of AMIS to deploy its troops on the 
ground, having to rely on air lifts organised by donor countries. 
Besides the capacity bottlenecks discussed above, other challenges play an 
important role. The AU will have to find a sound solution to the problem of 
interlinking its new role in peace and security with the existing mechanisms 
at global and subregional level. The AU is endeavouring to establish a single, 
coherent and comprehensive security system in the African continent. Yet its 
“building blocks”, the RECs, differ widely in capacity, political will and 
interests. The regional workshops currently setting up the ASF are an impor-
tant first step to meeting this challenge.  
Although integrated missions are regarded as the norm in AU declarations, 
peace support operations are still primarily equated with military missions. 
The AU is advancing more slowly in the areas of early warning, mediation 
and post-conflict reconstruction than in the field of military operations. Nor 
does the Political Affairs Directorate yet have the necessary capacities, and it 
is not routinely involved in the civil aspects of peace and security. The differ-
ence in planning and implementation between civil and military instruments 
needs to be carefully examined in the future. Before steps are taken to address 
this disparity, it must be considered whether planning has been unrealistically 
overambitious, given the AU’s capacities, and whether it reflects the true 
priorities. 
Heavy reliance on external donors will be inevitable for a long time to come 
and must be controlled if African ownership of policies and interventions is 
to be secured. This is all the truer as at least some donors have strong national 
interests in the field of African peace and security by which their assistance is 
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guided. Yet at the moment the AU sees its ownership as given. According to 
the AU, donor interests are so widely strewn as to provide financial support 
for all its areas of interest. At the same time, such instances as the envisaged 
intervention in Somalia that did not receive donor support and could not 
therefore be realised are proof that the African Union is restrained in its ac-
tions. However, ownership cannot be judged solely from the plans and re-
quests of the AU’s PSD. If the basis is extended to embrace the whole AU, 
the danger of overfunding peace and security activities must be borne in 
mind. It may be aggravated by the fact that donors supporting the APSA have 
been dealing directly with the PSD owing to poor overall AU capacities. If 
the basis is further extended to include all African states, the question of 
ownership becomes even more complex. Many countries fear that money 
which could have been used for their socio-economic development is being 
redirected to conflicts in other countries, thus constraining their opportunities 
for development and leaving them more prone to future conflict. A vibrant 
and representative civil society within the AU through ECOSOCC or outside 
the AU that might allow more insights into Africans’ general priorities has 
still to be established. The Pan-African Parliament cannot yet play this role. 
The problem of ownership will not therefore be easy to solve in the near 
future. However, this is not to say that no attention need be paid to this ques-
tion of cooperation. On the contrary, African actors, whether the African 
Union, African states or African civil society organisations, and donors must 
give even more consideration to the question of African ownership in the 
peace and security sphere. A more coordinated approach by donors could 
exacerbate this problem further. Closer donor coordination is often demanded 
because it would facilitate cooperation for the African Union in many ways. 
Yet it would also confront the AU with a donor bloc that might not offer the 
currently wide variety of assistance that enables the AU to find support for all 
its envisaged activities. 
In general, the AU is not yet a strong, well established institution. It is also 
made up of mostly weak states. It is a given in international organisations that 
some member states bypass these organisations or even undermine their ef-
forts in their desire to further their national priorities. This has been even 
truer of African organisations in the past. Moreover, many African govern-
ments strongly defend their national sovereignty and will not easily give in to 
the principle of non-indifference if it comes to putting words into deeds. It 
will therefore be a great challenge for the AU to develop sufficient autonomy 
to exercise real power in the field of peace and security. Emerging rivalries 
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between member states and the AU Commission, which does not see itself as 
a mere secretariat, are signs of this process. Consequently, the empowerment 
of major regional leaders in the peace and security field also needs a well 
designed strategy. These regional powers are meant to play a more active and 
positive role in safeguarding and establishing peace. Along the way, it re-
mains unclear how they can be restrained from pursuing the hegemonic ten-
dencies that so easily accompany these measures. Besides achieving political 
autonomy, the AU will have to install monitoring instruments to ensure the 
implementation of formal mandates and resolutions. 
Civil society could play an important role where these challenges are con-
cerned. Through its participation it could ensure African ownership of activi-
ties in the peace and security field, offer its training capacities and its know-
how, have its say on a well designed civil-military balance and hold the AU 
and member states to account. However, civil society has its own challenges 
to face. The number of institutions with a continental outreach is small, and 
most of them are based in one country, South Africa. At the same time, many 
organisations are active in this field at grass-roots or national level. Their 
integration into the continental discourse should be fostered. While the AU 
still has to explain what role it plans to give think-tanks and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), this would allow civil society organisa-
tions to press for wider participation on more representative and therefore 
legitimate grounds.  
4 A shared responsibility for peace in Africa: framing 
AU-UN relationships 
In the area of peace and security, the United Nations (UN) may be considered 
the most important partner of the AU, especially with regard to peacekeeping 
operations. The word “partner” implies that the AU cannot and does not seek 
to take on the UN’s role in Africa. The UN still plays the predominant role in 
the deployment of peacekeeping missions in Africa and is likely to retain this 
role in years to come. Around 75 per cent or almost US$ 2,9 billion of the 
UN’s peacekeeping mission funding in its 2004/05 budget was spent on Af-
rica (Klingebiel 2005b, 2). 
The need to strengthen regional organisations does not end with recognition 
and bestowed legitimacy. Material support and the transfer of lessons learned 
are needed to turn words into deeds. Here the UN, jointly with other regional 
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organisations and member states, is an increasingly important component of 
AU capacity-building (Fawcett 2006, 4). The current challenge for the AU is, 
ironically, not financial resources, but absorption of capacity and the identifi-
cation of alternative and often novel ways of organizing peacekeeping with-
out the experience gained by the United Nations and its Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations in the past (Cilliers 2005). The UN’s experience in 
developing its own capacities thus plays a vital role in motivating the AU and 
African regional organisations in meeting similar challenges. Positive exam-
ples in this regard are the substantial involvement of highly experienced UN 
personnel in the ASF workshops and the early creation of a UN office of 
mission support for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).  
The following paragraphs focus on the relationship between the AU and the 
UN with special reference to cooperation in the field of peace support opera-
tions. First, the basis of cooperation will be outlined. Second, special atten-
tion will be paid to the question of the legitimisation of interventions. Third, 
various types of operations in the African continent will be considered. The 
AU missions in Burundi and Darfur and the modalities of an envisaged hand-
over of the Darfur mission to the UN will be examined. Fourth, the debate on 
the establishment of an integrated AU mission capacity versus a model of a 
division of labour in which the UN continues to focus on the civilian compo-
nents of peace support operations will be described.  
4.1 Basis for cooperation 
The cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is based on 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Article 52(1) of which states that “nothing in 
the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agen-
cies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations.” Since the 1990s, the UN’s failures in 
the face of some of Africa’s security challenges have reinforced a desire for 
greater autonomy and for an “African solutions to African problems” ap-
proach to peace and security in the continent (Ibok 2004, 16). Hence the 
worldwide trend to enhance regional architectures has also been reflected in 
the African security context.  
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While the “Brahimi Report” was surprisingly silent on the evolving role of 
regional actors, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
underlined in its 2004 report that the “Security Council has not made the 
most of the potential advantages of working with regional and sub-regional 
organisations” (High-level Panel 2004, 14). The report emphasises that con-
sultations and cooperation should be expanded and could be formalised, cov-
ering such issues as meetings of heads of organisations, exchange of informa-
tion, early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel and ex-
change of personnel within peace operations. Importantly, it gives special 
recognition to African regional and sub-regional capacities in that it suggests 
a 10-year process of sustainable capacity-building support by donor countries 
within the AU framework (High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change 2004, 71). The 2005 World Summit Outcome reiterated the impor-
tance of forging predictable arrangements, again singling out the special 
relevance of the AU (UN 2005e, 24). The specific terms of a memorandum of 
understanding between the AU and the UN are being discussed in this light. 
4.2 Basis for legitimising peace operations  
The High-level Panel emphasises that the authorisation of the Security Coun-
cil should be sought by regional organisations in all cases, but it allows 
Council authorisation to be given after a regional operation begins (High-
level Panel 2004, 85 f). It is striking, however, that neither the AU nor 
ECOWAS requires its actions to be authorised by the UN Security Council. 
Both organisations intend to seek UN authorisation, but not to be restricted 
by it (Holt 2005, 49 f). With regard to the AU, the provisions of the UN 
Charter on the promotion of peace and security in Africa are acknowledged in 
the preamble of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC). How-
ever, it is unclear how the PSC will react when the UN is unable or unwilling 
to authorise appropriate action. This leaves some freedom for interpretation 
and hence enough scope for the AU to react before receiving UN authorisa-
tion (Golaszinski 2004,3–4). 
The responsibility to protect, first outlined in 2001 by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, is implicit in the found-
ing document of the African Union (AU 2000) and has only recently turned 
into a normative vision of the United Nations (High-level 2004; UN 2005a). 
However, this concept has yet truly to overcome the tension between compet-
ing claims of state sovereignty and the right to intervene. At AU level, as 
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Powell observes, “both the missions in Burundi and Darfur do not represent 
the ‘last resort’ type of interventions envisioned in the responsibility to pro-
tect and the AU’s Constitutive Act. In both cases, the AU’s involvement was 
conditional upon receiving consent from the host authorities/governments” 
(Powell 2005, 4). Thus the future will reveal how the two organisations inter-
pret their right or responsibility to protect civilians against war crimes, geno-
cide and crimes against humanity and how interpretations of this norm – 
always influenced by political will – match, differ or conflict.  
As regards the UN Security Council’s practice of referring to Chapter VIII, 
four recent African peace operations led by the ECOWAS and the AU reveal 
how the Security Council’s approach varies. Firstly, in February 2003 the UN 
welcomed the actions of ECOWAS and the previous deployment of French 
troops in Côte d’Ivoire. It requested both missions to report periodically to 
the Security Council. Secondly, in Liberia in 2003, the UN authorised an 
ECOWAS multilateral force under Chapter VII and cited Chapter VIII.7 
Thirdly, the UN did not authorise the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) under 
Chapter VII or VIII in 2003. In 2004, the Security Council welcomed the 
contributions of the AU operation, but did not provide direct authorisation. 
Lastly, the Council welcomed, rather than authorised, the AU mission in 
Sudan (Holt 2005).  
4.3 Division of responsibility for peace operations in 
Africa  
To simplify the relationship between the AU and UN with respect to peace 
operations, four types of operation in the African continent can be identified:  
1. UN peacekeeping missions: At the end of 2005, the United Nations was 
leading eight peace operations in Africa: in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the 
                                                          
7 While Chapter VI of the UN Charter covers the pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter VII 
forms the basis for “actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression”. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter concerns regional arrangements. It be-
gins with Article 52 which reads as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action 
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” For an online version of the UN Charter 
see http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Western Sahara and Southern Sudan. A total of 54,129 peacekeepers – 
compared to 69,717 worldwide – were deployed in these missions (UN 
2005d).8 
2. Deployment of missions of regional organisations or the AU: The AU 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is one example that will be considered further 
in the following chapter. 
3. Co-deployment: This type of operation involves the deployment of UN 
peacekeeping troops alongside those of regional organisations or the AU. 
The most important examples in the African continent have been the UN 
and ECOWAS co-deployments in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Francis et 
al. 2005, 52 f). 
4. Sequenced deployment: This type combines the first two types described 
above, a mission by a regional organisation or the AU being followed up 
by a United Nations mission.  
In the following paragraphs empirical evidence will be presented for the 
mission in Burundi, which is an example of sequenced deployment, and for 
the mission in Darfur, an example of a mission undertaken by the AU on its 
own. As will be shown during the discussion of the mission in Burundi, 
which also has characteristics of co-deployment, and of the “re-hatting” of 
the mission in Darfur from an AU to a UN mission, this classification is not 
perfect. 
The AU mission in Burundi  
The AU mission in Burundi (AMIB) constituted what de Coning refers to as 
a “hybrid mission” inasmuch as it was undertaken to keep the peace in the 
absence of a comprehensive ceasefire, but lacked the civilian functions that 
usually form part of such complex peace operations (de Coning 2005). Dur-
ing the AMIB mission, the United Nations operated alongside the AU in the 
Burundi political process and offered resources from its United Nations Mis-
sion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The AU understood 
from the outset that it could not sustain the mission for long and negotiated 
with the UN to take over the leadership in Burundi in 2004 (Holt 2005, 41). 
When it took over, the UN retained AMIB’s command structures largely 
                                                          
8 As at 31 October 2005; the number indicates total military and police personnel; civilian 
personnel are excluded. 
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intact and absorbed the African troops already on the ground. Overall, this 
“re-hatting” was widely judged to have been successful (Powell 2005, 38). 
Powell suggests that the AU’s recent experience in Burundi lays the founda-
tions for the emergence of a division of labour between the AU and UN, with 
the AU deploying a military mission in response to a crisis and creating suffi-
ciently stable conditions for the Security Council to authorise UN deploy-
ment. The UN and other international actors will perform the civilian func-
tions that typically form part of complex peace operations (Powell 2005, 24).  
However, the division of labour between the AU and UN may reveal a trou-
bling double standard. As Powell comments:  
“The fact that AMIB was deployed to an insecure environment with half 
the resources and personnel as ONUB [United Nations Mission in Bu-
rundi] risks creating a two-tiered system of international security where 
the lives of some peacekeepers and the people for whom they are keeping 
the peace are implicitly accorded less value than others.” (Powell 2005, 
40)  
She also stresses the need for a shared understanding of the nature of the 
conflict and an agenda for its resolution on which all the cooperating organi-
sations are agreed. While these conditions obtained between the UN and AU 
in Burundi, it is not clear that they exist in Darfur (Powell 2005, 49).  
The AU mission in Sudan  
As regards the mission in Darfur, the AU can be described as being at war 
while still building its defence ministry. Only two years after being estab-
lished, the AU was already engaged in a mission. The following section will 
give some insight into the mission’s achievements and setbacks and discuss 
the pros and cons of the mission being handed over to the United Nations.  
As it is the AU’s first genuine peace operation, AMIS represents an important 
political step towards African responsibility in the continent. The fact that the 
AU sent 7,000 troops into the crisis area is a success in itself. In a critical 
situation the AU had the courage to take action, while the international com-
munity was still observing the situation and the UN was preoccupied with its 
engagement in Haiti and Liberia. To meet their commitment, AMIS helped to 
stabilize the situation in Darfur. One of the goals was to create stability, oth-
ers were to take care of internally displaced persons and to build administra-
tive structures, neither of which has been achieved. 
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Box 2: Background to the Darfur conflict 
The United Nations described the situation in Darfur as one of the world’s worst 
humanitarian crises. Attacks by the Sudanese government and militia have forced 
around 2 million people, mostly black African farmers, out of their homes, and 
120,000 have fled to neighbouring Chad. Possibly more than 180,000 (estimates 
rise to 400,000) have died in violent raids – despite a nominal ceasefire – and many 
more of starvation (IRIN News 2006). Behind the crisis is a conflict between sed-
entary farmers of Arab descent and nomadic cattle-herders of African descent, 
which began in the mid-1980s and erupted violently in February 2003. Then the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), both 
rebel groups of African descent, took up arms against the Arab-dominated gov-
ernment in Khartoum to end what they call the neglect and oppression of the in-
habitants of the region (IRIN News 2006). In response, the Sudanese army and 
Janjaweed militia, recruited from local Arab tribes and armed by the government, 
brutally fought back, conducting “indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civil-
ians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, (…) throughout 
Darfur” (UN 2005 f.). 
When it became clear that the international community would not intervene to stop 
the conflict, the AU stepped in. By sending first observers, then troops into the 
immense and hostile area of Darfur, the AU showed it was ready to resolve a very 
complex conflict involving not only different ethnic groups and associated rebel 
groups, but also the Sudanese government and neighbouring countries. 
AMIS (AU Mission in Sudan) 
The AU’s initial reaction was to set up a Ceasefire Commission in May 2004, 
accompanied by a small monitoring force on the ground. Then the AU Director for 
Peace and Security, Sam Ibok, announced on the eve of the AU summit that the 
number involved in this force would be increased to 60 military observers, who 
would monitor the ceasefire signed in April 2004, with 300 troops to protect them. 
“With escalating violence, however, the two-year-old AU saw the Darfur conflict 
as a test case for its self-declared mandate to have Africans resolve African con-
flicts” (O’Neill / Cassis 2005). What was then known as the “Ceasefire Monitoring 
Mission” was largely made up of Rwandan and Nigerian troops. 
The view of the AU's Peace and Security Council that Sudan’s cooperation and 
consent were required resulted in a mandate restricted to monitoring the ceasefire 
and to protecting the monitors (O’Neill / Cassis 2005). On 20 October 2004, the 
PSC decided to increase AMIS to 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 troops (of 
whom 450 would be military observers), up to 815 civilian police and an appropri-
ate number of civilian personnel. AMIS II was given a stronger mandate to im-
prove the security situation throughout Darfur, to ensure a safe environment for 
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Despite the admirable deployment of an African peace operation and the 
improvements in Darfur, the humanitarian situation there is still intolerable. 
Consequently, the international press is almost unanimous in describing 
AMIS as a failure. When it comes to the reasons for the failure of the AU 
humanitarian assistance and, most importantly, to protect civilians, the internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). However, it was stressed that the protection of civilians 
was the responsibility of the government of Sudan. This task was based on a funda-
mental but false assumption “that the government of Sudan would provide basic 
protection to civilians, including IDPs. Instead, government soldiers and their mili-
tias have constituted the greatest danger to civilians and especially IDPs” (O’Neill / 
Cassis 2005). 
On 9 November 2004 the government of Sudan and the two leading rebel groups, 
JEM and SLA, signed two short-term peace agreements seeking progress towards an 
end to the conflict. The first treaty established a no-fly zone over rebel-controlled 
areas of Darfur, a measure designed to end the Sudanese military's bombing of rebel 
villages in the region. The second accord granted international humanitarian aid 
agencies unrestricted access to the Darfur region. The agreements were the product 
of AU-sponsored peace talks in Abuja that began on 25 October 2004. Another 
increase in the strength of AMIS took place in April 2005, when the PSC decided to 
deploy 7,731 personnel by 30 September 2005. Consequently, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Gambia, Kenya and South Africa also deployed troops. There is still a 
disparity between authorised personnel and staff on the ground, with 6,752 currently 
deployed in Darfur. 
Currently, the ceasefire is being violated from all sides, and the prospect of sustain-
able peace in Darfur still seems remote – despite recent advances in peace talks in 
Abuja. After missing the deadline for a comprehensive agreement set by the AU for 
the end of April, a peace agreement was finally signed on 5 May 2006 by the Suda-
nese government and one group within the rebel SLA, while the rival SLA group 
and the smaller rebel group JEM refused to participate. The division among the 
rebel movements has posed one of the main difficulties all through the two years of 
peace talks in Abuja and still threatens the peace process. 
A joint AU/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was authorised by Security 
Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007. The Council, acting under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter, authorised UNAMID (United Nations – AU Mission in 
Darfur) to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement and to protect its personnel and civilians, without “prejudice to 
the responsibility of the Government of Sudan”. The Council decided that 
UNAMID should begin implementing its mandate not later than 31 December 2007.
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mission, a wide range of explanations is put forward. The mandate is often 
mentioned as the main obstacle to attaining a greater impact in the Darfur 
region. It is perceived as having been too weak and too vaguely worded, 
partly because the AU’s Peace and Security Council has described the situa-
tion in Darfur as an “internal conflict” rather than “genocide”, as the United 
States has done, and partly because of the Sudanese government’s uncoopera-
tive stance. Taking a different view, some observers recall that the AMIS 
mandate was fairly robust, but point to the lack of will to implement it on the 
ground owing to the inadequate briefing of the troops. Accordingly, the main 
problem is the divergence between the mandate and its enforcement. Closely 
linked to this criticism – especially in the eyes of foreign donors – is the un-
satisfactory command and control structure. The virtual non-existence of a 
functioning chain of command is responsible for many difficulties experi-
enced on the ground, such as badly maintained camps, a lack of qualified 
health personnel and poor coordination in general. The planned Joint Opera-
tions Group, bringing together the military, the police and the humanitarian 
component under one head, to lead and coordinate the mission has yet to be 
formed.  
Another common explanation for AMIS’s shortcomings – often put forward 
by the African side – is the lack of financial support. In fact, AMIS has been 
heavily supported by foreign donors, but funds were running out by the end 
of April 2006. Along the same line, the number of troops was not commensu-
rate with the size of the region. To keep the area under control, an increase in 
AU troop strength to at least 20,000 would have been necessary (O’Neill / 
Cassis 2005). An additional credible explanation is the AU’s lack of logistics 
and equipment. 
In short, AMIS’s primary responsibility is to protect IDPs from attacks by 
rebel groups, foremost among them the Janjaweed, in camps spread across 
Darfur. In fact, the security situation has improved significantly in areas 
where troops are deployed. Nonetheless, the humanitarian situation is still far 
from acceptable, and AMIS is unable fully to protect IDPs. If it is to carry out 
its mandate successfully, AMIS needs to be reinforced. In addition, the mis-
sion lacks effective command and control structures, logistical support and 
operational practice (ACCORD 2005).  
At political level, peace talks chaired by the AU are regularly held in Abuja, 
Nigeria. In addition to representatives of the AU, all the groups involved and 
the governments of Sudan and Chad, experts from donor countries try – in a 
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rather uncoordinated manner – to advance the peace process, which is largely 
funded by donor contributions. While the money may be well spent, negotia-
tions are making very slow progress. The high-level talks – mediated by 
Africa Union Chairman and Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso – 
have reached the seventh round. However, the signing of a peace agreement 
in early May 2006 was the first sign of success. Further mediation efforts and 
political pressure will continue in an attempt to persuade the hitherto absent 
rebel groups to sign the document. In any case, the new peace agreement has 
yet to be applied on the ground. So far, ceasefires have been violated by vari-
ous sides, including the Sudanese government. Yet, the AU consistently fails 
to bring up these issues at a higher political level or with Sudan.  
A joint AU/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was authorised by 
Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007. The Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorised UNAMID (United 
Nations – AU Mission in Darfur) to take any necessary action to support the 
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to protect its personnel 
and civilians, without “prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of 
Sudan”. The Council decided that UNAMID should begin implementing its 
mandate not later than 31 December 2007. 
In summary, the AU mission in Sudan can be regarded as an important politi-
cal step, since the AU “took up the challenge from scratch” and sent troops 
into the rough and immense region of Darfur to stabilize, monitor and protect. 
Starting as an ad hoc mission, AMIS developed impressively into a full mis-
sion. By reacting to the crisis in Darfur, the PSC enhanced the African re-
sponse to conflicts in the continent. However, when the AU proved incapable 
of handling the situation in Darfur, the UN had to intervene, building on the 
successes of the current mission and learning from AMIS’s shortcomings. 
“Such an intervention can no longer be deferred on a misplaced reliance on 
‘African solutions for African problems.’ Otherwise the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ will become as empty a phrase in the 21st century as ‘never again’ 
was in the 20th” (O’Neill / Cassis 2005). 
5 Donor contributions to the African peace and 
security architecture 
The African peace and security architecture (APSA) is not an isolated regime 
comprising only African actors: this evolving architecture forms part of an 
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international context, and foreign actors are increasingly becoming involved 
in African peace and security matters.  
Africa, and especially peace and security in Africa, has been in the spotlight 
of international attention in recent years. The renewed engagement of the 
international community can clearly be interpreted as a response to new Afri-
can dynamics and, above all, to the creation of the AU. The paradigm shift 
from the principle of non-intervention to non-indifference, demonstrated by 
the AU’s Constitutive Act and, in practice, by the AU Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS), and the political will reflected in such initiatives as NEPAD give 
rise to hope and optimism.  
Chapter 5 forms a central part of our study, as it summarises our findings on 
donor contributions to the strengthening of the African peace and security 
architecture. In order to give a clear picture of donor support and its short-
comings, the findings are presented in a condensed fashion, indicating the 
focus and areas of this support, the modes of delivery and the management of 
the nexus between security and development. Coordination, demand orienta-
tion and funding are then identified as challenges to support for the APSA – 
as perceived from both the donor and the African side. 
The first part of the chapter introduces the major external actors – multilat-
eral, supranational and bilateral – and gives a brief overview of their ration-
ale, the focus of their support, the modes of delivery and nexus management 
in relation to the strengthening of the African peace and security architecture. 
The distribution of donor support at different levels of the APSA and to its 
various areas are then analysed. A closer examination of the recipients of 
assistance reveals the levels of the organisational structure at which the do-
nors engage – by supporting the AU, the Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), civil society or regional powers. A breakdown of the support into 
capacity-building, conflict prevention, military capacity, post-conflict recon-
struction and support for peace operations exposes both well-funded and 
rather neglected areas of support. 
The modes of delivery are then considered. Ranging from ‘in-kind’ contribu-
tions to budget support, the various ways of delivering assistance are illus-
trated with the aid of striking examples.  
Another focal area is nexus management by donors, where coordination and 
coherence among the various policies are examined, along with organisa-
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tional structures, sources of funding and in-situ implementing mechanisms 
illustrated by case studies.  
The chapter concludes by considering existing challenges encountered by 
donors and African institutions alike. Coordination poses a major challenge 
for the donor community and is a major complication for the AU. Demand 
orientation is a principle to which many donors may subscribe, but where 
follow-through is often lacking. Finally, the volume and predictability of 
funding are essential for an effective partnership between donors and the 
APSA.  
In fact, the attempt to find “African solutions to African problems” and ef-
forts to ensure African ownership of the peace and security architecture con-
trast with dependency on external actors and the lack of implementation ca-
pacities. Funding and capacity-building must be continued in order to em-
power African states to take on the responsibility to protect. Responding to 
the requests of NEPAD and AU, external actors are challenged to provide a 
coherent and well-coordinated policy. While some international actors suc-
cessfully integrate their national approaches into greater international activi-
ties, others keep to unilateral action and bilateral cooperation. But in their 
efforts to promote peace and security many, if not all, donors are trying to 
conform to the new African initiatives. 
5.1 Major donors 
Donors increasingly engage in peace and security in Africa. What, how, 
where and why do they contribute to the strengthening of the African peace 
and security architecture? This subchapter profiles major donors, providing 
an overview of their support, including their goals, focus, modes of delivery 
and management of the nexus between different policies related to peace and 
security in Africa. External actors with a long tradition of engagement with 
the African continent – the United Nations (UN) and former colonial powers 
– have been joined by newcomers to Africa, such as the European Union 
(EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and such bilateral 
actors as Germany and Japan. A combination of newcomers and countries 
with considerable experience of Africa, the Group of Eight (G8) also plays a 
central role in supporting the APSA. 
Africa and – even more important in our context – peace and security in Af-
rica are clearly the focus of the G8 summits. Furthermore, the G8 members 
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draw on the G8 Africa Action Plan (AAP) as a framework for their engage-
ment in the African continent and for their national strategies towards Africa. 
Traditionally unilateral actors, such as the USA and the UK, increasingly use 
the G8 as a platform for international initiatives for Africa, as Blair’s Com-
mission for Africa and Bush’s Global Peace Operations Initiative illustrate. In 
addition, the new EU Strategy for Africa presents an overarching framework 
for engagement with the APSA and will be elucidated in the following. Major 
partners of the APSA identified by the study are the EU, NATO, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (USA). The following table gives a brief overview of their key charac-
teristics and the main support they give to the APSA. 
5.2 Areas of support 
5.2.1 Capacity-building for the political and administrative 
structures of the AU and regional organisations 
There are two main instruments used by donors to enhance the AU’s capacity 
in the area of peace and security: the UNDP project (see 5.1) and the EU’s 
capacity- building funds. As the UNDP project is nearing its end and the 
European APF expires in 2007, donors are seeking alternative forms of en-
gagement. It is therefore impossible at present to determine the shape of sup-
port from this donor group for capacity-building in the AU from 2007 on-
wards. With respect to the EU, a total of € 35 million is set aside for building 
the capacities of the AU and RECs that are relevant to peace and security. 
Owing to its lack of absorptive capacity, the AU has been able to accept only 
€ 1.5 million of the € 6 million initially allocated for AU capacity-building. 
The most obvious problem for the AU is the slow recruitment process, which 
has resulted in its having a small number of overburdened staff. Among the 
many reasons for this slow recruitment are the comparatively higher salaries 
paid by other institutions, such as the UN. The consequent lack of capacity 
has therefore led donors to engage in capacity-building, but the recruitment 
problem is also the main cause of the AU’s lack of capacity to absorb donor 
funds: a “capacity-building vicious circle”. In addition, given the powerful 
notion of African ownership, the involvement of external advisers is a very 
sensitive issue in the AU.  
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Engagement in the strengthening of capacity in the areas of mediation and 
diplomacy takes very different forms. For instance, the UK is supporting the 
establishment of the Panel of the Wise, Canada is improving the AU’s civil-
ian observer capacities for political mediation, and the United States is con-
sidering the option of assisting the AU preventive diplomacy pool. 
In the case of capacity-building at the level of the regional organisations, 
ECOWAS is supported by Denmark through the Danish Africa Programme 
for Peace, by Canada and by the EU, which also supports the SADC and 
ECCAS, with Germany assisting the SADC. 
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5.2.2 Early warning systems 
The support for early warning systems is either channelled through the re-
gional organisations, mainly IGAD and the SADC, or takes the form of sup-
port for the development of the AU Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS). The EU has been assisting ECOWAS and ECCAS in this area, 
Germany supports IGAD, the United States supports ECOWAS and IGAD 
and has provided equipment for the AU situation room, and the UK provides 
support for the implementation of the CEWS through the ACPP. Despite 
these commitments, overall support for early warning systems is rather lim-
ited. As the advanced development of an early warning system in the IGAD 
region reveals, such a mechanism is highly complex, creating the need to 
focus only on certain types of conflicts. Furthermore, it is costly and politi-
cally sensitive in that it examines member countries’ internal affairs. Last but 
not least, early warning does not automatically generate action, which is 
based on the political will of states and regional organisations. The question-
ability of the success of early warning systems is an important reason for the 
cautious donor involvement in this area. 
5.2.3 Enhancing military capacity 
Support in this area focuses mainly on the development of the African 
Standby Force. The AU workshops for the development of specific compo-
nents of the ASF as outlined in the March 2005 “Roadmap for the Operation-
alisation of the African Standby Force” are currently attracting most atten-
tion. Each of the five workshops is organised by a regional organisation in 
cooperation with a lead partner. The organisational set-up is as follows: doc-
trine, standard operating procedures, command and control, communications 
and information, logistics systems (IGAD/UK) and training and evaluation 
systems (ECCAS/France, Canada). The United States is providing additional 
material support for the ASF in the form of communications equipment. 
France is contributing to the establishment of the ASF by providing equip-
ment and logistics, drawing on its military presence in the African continent. 
Where the civilian structures of the African Standby Force are concerned, 
Norway is currently funding the development of a conceptual framework by 
ACCORD. And through its Canada Fund for Africa Canada is seeking to 
enhance the AU’s capacity for the rapid deployment of unarmed military 
observers.  
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At regional level, donor support in the form of military training and funds for 
peacekeeping training centres are important building blocks for military ca-
pacity in the continent. Examples of the former include such initiatives as 
African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and 
RECAMP, and in the latter case the UK, Germany, Canada, Italy, the Nether-
lands and France (in descending order of amounts contributed) have commit-
ted considerable sums to the KAIPTC. The Regional Peacekeeping Training 
Centre in Harare was set up in 1997 with Danish support, which ended in 
2002. Finally, the Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya receives funding 
from the USA, the UK, Germany and the UN. 
All in all, the establishment of the ASF is a favoured area of donor support at 
AU level, since the AU structures and needs in this area are apparent, making 
donor support highly visible. Donor support structures for military training 
are still mainly bilateral.  
5.2.4 Support for peace operations 
Most support goes to peace operations, principally the AU mission in Darfur, 
followed by smaller missions such as those in the Central African Republic 
and Burundi. Centrality exists in resource and strategic terms: firstly, the 
sheer volume of resources needed to deploy peace operations absorbs most of 
the donor contributions; secondly, support is in the strategic interest of many 
donors, who wish to enable the AU to deploy troops rapidly. The allocation 
of resources from the EU’s APF is the clearest illustration of the financial 
bias towards peace operations. Of a total of € 250 million for the period 
2003–2007, € 162 million had been spent on Darfur alone by the end of 
March 2006, with an additional € 50 million committed to AMIS until its 
hand-over to the UN. The largest donor to AMIS in monetary terms is the 
United States with almost US$ 400 million, followed by the EU, Canada with 
€ 139 million and the UK with a contribution of £52 million.  
At subregional level, the UK and the EU have committed themselves to help 
fund the ECOWAS peace missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.  
5.2.5 Post-conflict reconstruction 
Engagement in the area of post-conflict reconstruction includes activities in 
countries emerging from conflict, such as the reintegration of former combat-
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ants, assistance with elections, the establishment of the rule of law and gov-
ernance structures, the improvement of the human rights situation and other 
measures that are important for long-term democracy, stability and recon-
ciliation. The AU envisages interventions in post-conflict situations that 
complement the efforts of the World Bank, UN and others, but does not cur-
rently have any structures to undertake such activities. Consequently, support 
in the area of post-conflict reconstruction has thus far played a marginal role. 
While both NEPAD and the AU are making progress at conceptual level, 
there is limited scope for capacity-building and no entry point for the imple-
mentation of concrete measures. Interestingly, Japan, which is keen to be-
come involved in this area, is now extending the UNDP project with US$ 2 
million earmarked for post-conflict reconstruction in the Great Lakes region, 
with the more specific objective of reintegrating former child soldiers.  
5.2.6 Conclusion: unbalanced support for the APSA?  
As outlined above, in the area of peace and security support for peace opera-
tions and military capacity is clearly the “donors’ darling” in terms of the 
allocation of financial resources. The question that therefore arises is whether 
peace operations and military capacity are being overfunded. To answer this 
question in the affirmative would be to overlook the fact that the AMIS re-
sources have been stretched from the outset and that the development of the 
ASF has urgently needed the attention it is currently being given. In light of 
the immense difficulties encountered by AMIS on the ground, largely be-
cause of the lack of financial resources, which has resulted in “a mission on 
the cheap”, this conclusion would be cynical to say the least.  
Even though there is donor support for “soft” peace and security issues within 
the AU, the question of capacity-building seems to be the crux. Finding a 
way to increase the number of qualified staff and effecting organisational 
transformation would most probably lead to greater absorptive capacity and, 
in turn, to more fruitful and substantial engagement in the areas of conflict 
prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Yet this would be to assume that 
such engagement is wanted by the AU. Debating areas of AU engagement 
also raises the question whether an already overburdened AU should engage 
in all the areas mentioned above or whether it should focus on the most press-
ing areas.  
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Lastly, there is not only a discussion on over/underfunding in the area of 
peace and security, but also in the AU in general. Here it is precisely the area 
of peace and security that is increasingly perceived by some donors to be 
overly favoured, leading to even weaker capacities in other departments, such 
as political affairs. This preference for the AU’s PSD – particularly if it fo-
cuses on “hard power” issues – may lead to a situation in which developmen-
tal, governance and human security questions related to conflict cannot be 
adequately addressed by the AU. The reform process that the UN has pain-
fully undergone over the last decade in bridging the fields of development 
and security may serve as a good example of the AU as it is currently devel-
oping its own structures. In the eyes of many poorly informed onlookers, the 
AU is all about peace and security. If the organisation wants to alter this 
perception, constructive ways of engaging and a clear role for the AU in other 
fields should be identified. For donors it is consequently important to ques-
tion their own motives in supporting the AU, to react to the demands of its 
organisations and to decide on areas of engagement. 
5.3 Modes of delivery 
Donors offer a variety of modes of delivery when supporting APSA. The AU, 
being the main partner in this regard, does not have any clear preferences in 
the short and medium term. In the long-term, however, the AU favours 
budget support. Owing to the flexibility on the African side in the short and 
medium term, the modes of delivery usually reflect the donors’ preferences. 
This results in a contribution that in most cases relies heavily on one mode of 
delivery, other modes being used only for smaller contributions. Overall, six 
different modes of delivery can be identified and will be considered in this 
chapter: equipment/‘in-kind’ support, financial support, budget support, tech-
nical support, pooled support and trilateral cooperation. These modes of de-
livery have been chosen because of their interesting features. Some overlap-
ping therefore exists, this being most obvious in the case of financial contri-
butions and budget support, but the same can be said of pooled contributions, 
which may consist of financial or technical support.  
5.3.1 Equipment / ‘in-kind’ support 
In-kind contributions are offered and made by many donors. The USA, UK 
and Canada deliver significant amounts of their contributions to AMIS in 
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kind. But there are also many more examples of smaller in-kind contributions 
for civil and military uses. The United States relies almost completely on in-
kind contributions in the support given mainly to AMIS. Camps are built and 
troops equipped by US companies awarded contracts through US tenders and 
paid by the US Administration. The USA therefore retains an important say 
in its contributions. The AU has little say. In the case of AMIS camps, for 
example, it is limited to their number and location. Interestingly, the AU does 
not generally resist in-kind contributions despite the comparatively little 
influence it is able to exercise as a result of this mode of delivery. Yet the AU 
also sees it as having its positive sides. It receives the goods more quickly in 
this way than if it invited tenders itself. In-kind contributions thus relieve the 
AU of the tendering process and also of reporting obligations to donors. The 
AU’s positive stance towards in-kind contributions is therefore likely to con-
tinue, at least until its financial reporting mechanisms have matured and its 
bureaucracy has become more efficient. 
5.3.2 Financial support 
Almost all donors contribute cash earmarked for specific purposes. These 
sums are usually rather small and intended for conferences, mediation efforts, 
etc. The most significant exception to this rule is the EU’s APF. Of its total of 
€ 250 million, € 210 million is earmarked for peace support operations in 
general. The activities funded from these cash contributions are decided 
jointly, in practice on a request from the AU. Cash contributions are vital to 
the operation of the APSA. Without donors’ financial contributions, the PSD 
could function only at a basic level.  
5.3.3 Budget support 
Many donors – the EU, the Nordic countries and Germany, for example – 
have considered giving budget support to the AU. At the moment, the EU is 
the only donor actually to have pledged a considerable amount as budget 
support. It has committed itself to giving  € 55 million in budget support from 
2007. In connection with this commitment, the EU has commissioned a fidu-
ciary assessment of the AU’s internal financial and accounting mechanisms. 
The negative preliminary results of this assessment have caused many donors 
to drop their plans to give budget support in the near future. The AU also sees 
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the need for adjustments and will not insist on budget support until its finan-
cial mechanisms have matured. 
5.3.4 Technical support  
Technical support is a very common mode of delivery for development and 
military actors assisting the APSA. Hence the large number of technical sup-
port projects that have to be managed by the AU and RECs. With most do-
nors pulling out of the AU/UNDP project, the AU is expecting an even larger 
sum in bilateral technical support. Donors have begun to react to this prob-
lem. At the beginning of 2006, they discussed a technical assistance pool, but 
no decision has yet been taken and no memorandum of understanding has 
been signed. Technical support is given to build capacity within the AU and 
REC structures related to peace and security, to facilitate the formulation of 
strategies, to help set up the ASF or to manage peace support operations. The 
DITF aside, long-term experts from donor countries are not common in AU 
structures owing to the AU’s efforts to ensure an African identity.  
5.3.5 Pooled support 
Both financial and technical support can also be pooled by donors. The 
AU/UNDP project, also known as the UNDP capacity-building basket, is the 
most prominent example of pooled funding for the AU. Other than that, a 
contribution of US$ 2.5 million to the AU Peace Fund by Norway and Swe-
den and € 200,000 contributed annually to Denmark’s Africa Programme for 
Peace (APP) by Austria are the only examples of pooled funding. UNDP has 
pooled funds from Germany, Sweden, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the UK amounting to US$ 7.9 million for the AU/UNDP project 
that ends in 2006. The funds have been spent on AU staff salaries paid 
through the UN, equipment, external expertise and facilitating meetings and 
conferences. Yet most donors are not prepared to maintain this mode of de-
livery and plan to withdraw from the project once it expires. They consider it 
to be inefficient and expensive because of the overheads of UNDP and the 
United Nations Operation Project Services (UNOPS). Among the AU mem-
ber states, this mode of delivery and the AU/UNDP project enjoy a good 
standing. The PSD appreciates the one-stop communication with donors 
through UNDP. Reporting is also facilitated for the AU and its capacities are 
therefore spared, because all donors have agreed to apply the same reporting 
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requirements and assessment indicators. Moreover, the AU/UNDP project 
has been a reliable partner for the AU through its predictable, programmatic 
and aligned funding.  
5.3.6 Trilateral cooperation 
The newest mode of delivery in support of the APSA is trilateral cooperation. 
The idea underlying this mode of delivery is that it enables regional powers 
to implement projects in other countries of the African continent. All three 
parties to this form of cooperation are states. The assistance given to the Afri-
can implementing partners may take the form of financial or technical sup-
port. Projects can be implemented by the donor and the partner country or by 
the partner country on its own. If the assistance provided is to be regarded as 
genuine APSA support in the context of this study, the AU must assign to the 
regional power the task which donors enable it to perform. Hitherto, the only 
donors to have engaged in this form of cooperation in the peace and security 
field have been the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden and the only African 
implementing partner state has been South Africa. Beneficiaries of trilateral 
cooperation in the peace and security field have so far been the DRC, Angola 
and Rwanda. The small number of donors using this mode of delivery is due 
to the novelty of trilateral cooperation. It appeals to many donors, and many 
are planning similar projects with South Africa. Yet trilateral cooperation 
also poses serious difficulties and dangers. One major constraint is the ca-
pacities of the African implementing partners. Not even South Africa, which 
is actively promoting this form of cooperation, currently has an efficient 
implementing structure. It also lacks an underlying political strategy, result-
ing in the odd situation of its intentionally acting as a donor, while refusing to 
be regarded as an emerging donor because of its apartheid past and the suspi-
cion in Africa that it has hegemonic aspirations. Donors should indeed be 
aware of the risk inherent in trilateral cooperation of its increasing hegemonic 
tendencies and capabilities. This mode of delivery may also weaken the AU’s 
position within the APSA, if donors do not regard an AU mandate as manda-
tory or, even better, extend this mode of delivery to ‘quadrilateral’ contribu-
tions by channelling their funds to African implementing partners through the 
AU.  
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5.4 Nexus management 
As shown in the conceptual debate in Chapter 2 and as became evident dur-
ing the empirical fieldwork, interfaces between security and development 
policy exist when development policy supports the APSA. Thus an assess-
ment of four criteria enables four management models to be developed (see 
Table 3): distancing, complementarity, coordination and subordination. The 
criterion approach is applied to determine whether the strategies of develop-
ment and security policy are separate, aligned or identical. Actors can either 
have separate funds to finance their activities or pool their funds. The same is 
true of the implementation of activities, which can be either separate or joint. 
The criterion hierarchy has a special meaning in that it differentiates between 
the management models of cooperation and subordination. When both poli-
cies act at the same level, they cooperate. When one of the actors is superior 
in the hierarchy, the management model is subordination. Although it tends 
to be possible for donors to be assigned to one of the four management mod-
els, it must be borne in mind that, in most empirical cases, donors use hybrid 
forms when managing the nexus. 
In this subchapter, the aforementioned typology of management models will 
be illustrated with the aid of empirical evidence. Through the assignment of 
Table 3: Nexus management models 
Management 
model 
Distancing Complementarity Cooperation Subordination 
Approach Separate Aligned Identical Different 
options possi-
ble  
Funds Separate Separate, but 
aligned 
Pooled Different 
options possi-
ble 
Implementation Separate Separate, but 
aligned 
Joint Different 
options possi-
ble 
Hierarchy No No No Yes 
Source: own compilation 
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one matching donor approach to each management model, risks and chal-
lenges posed by each model can be identified inductively. This will allow a 
better understanding of the implications when political actors reflect or de-
cide on a certain model for managing the nexus. It will also be possible to 
infer what various impacts each management model entails for support given 
to the APSA. It is assumed that the impact of donor contributions varies ac-
cording to the various management models. 
5.4.1 Distancing 
If one of the policies acts independently from the other, development policy 
can pursue self-reliant, development-oriented and mostly long-term goals, but 
may possibly run the risk of losing influence on the government’s framework 
of security, which guides, directly or indirectly, development engagement in 
conflict countries.  
For example, Germany’s management of interfaces is based on distance be-
tween the different policies. At institutional level, three German ministries 
are involved in the cooperation with the APSA: the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Foreign 
Ministry (AA) and the German Ministry of Defence (BMVg). Rationale, 
political will to take action and experience of peace- and security-related 
issues in Africa differ from one to the other. The BMZ, the AA and the 
BMVg have each outlined their own policy strategies for sub-Saharan Africa 
that guide their engagement, and each has its own fund. 
Advantages and disadvantages of this nexus management model become 
apparent when the German example is analysed. On the one hand, German 
development policy interacts independently with other policies, which allows 
it to pursue its own long-term and development-oriented goals. If these goals 
are to be achieved, the structural causes of conflict must be reduced and cri-
ses nipped in the bud, civil society and state actors must be supported in non-
violent conflict transformation and contributions made to peace-building in 
post-conflict situations through conflict transformation, reconstruction and 
reconciliation measures (BMZ 2005b). For these activities, the BMZ has 
access to its own funding and so does not need to coordinate closely with 
other ministries. On the other hand, the divided institutional structure does 
not permit a coherent approach to be adopted, which stands in the way of any 
significant contribution to the APSA. As a result, the visibility of engagement 
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is diminished owing to there being a number of organisations in situ, each 
with its own approach. Furthermore, complex mechanisms of coordination 
among the representatives of the various ministries and organisations in situ 
are needed if a common position is to be demonstrated. Coordination there-
fore becomes comparatively time-consuming and costly.  
The German government is taking its first steps towards the cooperation 
model. Its strategy for worldwide peace and security since 2004 has called for 
closer cooperation at strategic level among several government departments 
(AA 2004b). Germany’s support for regional peacekeeping training centres is 
another example of closer cooperation among several policies. The Peace 
Support Training Centre in Nairobi and the Kofi Annan International Peace-
keeping Training Centre in Harare are supported by various instruments of 
the German Foreign, Development and Defence Ministries. 
5.4.2 Complementarity 
Coherent and efficient policies are implemented on the basis of aligned goals, 
with none of the stakeholders having to give up clearly defined areas of re-
sponsibility.  
Canada’s restructured foreign policy is the best example of the alignment of 
diplomacy, defence policy and development policy, which is outlined in its 
International Policy Statement entitled “A role of Pride and Influence in the 
World” (Government of Canada 2005a). The funds and instruments differ 
among the implementing institutions but are aligned as a consequence of the 
common approach. Financial support for the APSA is provided by the Can-
ada Fund for Africa, which is managed by the Canadian International Devel-
opment Agency (CIDA), and goes to areas of support that include political, 
administrative and military capacities. Foreign policy has its own financial 
instrument, the Global Peace and Security Fund. The support for AMIS, the 
largest financial contribution by the Canadian government, is partly funded 
by the Foreign Office through the Global Peace and Security Fund (CAN$ 20 
million). The bulk of the support for AMIS (CAN$ 170 million) is managed 
by the Foreign Office, but comes directly from the Treasury. Local activities 
are closely coordinated with representatives of the various policy areas, who 
are located together in one office.  
In conclusion, Canadian support for the AU is significant in terms of finan-
cial contributions and of the range of activities that can be covered by the 
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various actors involved. The Canadian position in situ is well aligned and, as 
it is usually expressed with one voice, carries weight at donor meetings. Nev-
ertheless, the extensive commitment to military support compared to civilian 
support poses the potential risk of development policy being unable to exer-
cise sufficient influence on the security agenda.  
5.4.3 Cooperation  
Where there is close cooperation among the various policies, development 
policy can have a strong influence on the government’s security framework 
owing to the common approach adopted, but it may have to shift its commit-
ment and funds to more short-term, military objectives.  
The UK is an example of a model that is based on close cooperation between 
development, foreign and defence policy in terms of funding and coherence 
of approach. The joint Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, through which most 
of the UK’s support for conflict resolution in Africa is channelled, was cre-
ated in 2001. It pools UK expertise and funds from the Department for Inter-
national Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Minis-
try of Defence to provide a coherent response to peace and security in Africa 
(UK 2005). This interdepartmental pooled funding arrangement is designed 
to increase the effectiveness of conflict prevention, thus reducing the high 
costs associated with military intervention (Austin / Chalmers 2004, 4). At 
the same time, pooled funding requires better coordination of non-military 
activities with peacekeeping missions, which may more effectively prevent 
the re-emergence of conflict in violence-prone countries and regions (DFID 
2005b).  
In general, the coherent approach may be one role model for engagement 
with the AU. The close cooperation among all the stakeholders enables the 
UK to allocate large sums. At the same time, it precludes high overheads 
since it has a common concept at strategic level, and coordination in situ is 
comparatively uncomplicated. This approach also allows the UK to cover a 
wide range of areas of support with short-, medium- and long-term perspec-
tives, such as assisting military capacities for AMIS and the ASF, contribut-
ing to conflict prevention and early warning and providing the AU with logis-
tical aid.  
Another example of the cooperation model is the European Union’s African 
Peace Facility,  which demonstrates how development policy cooperates 
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closely with various other policies in a common approach, with the focus 
clearly on strengthening the AU’s military capacities. The establishment of 
the African Peace Facility will be backed by EU development resources up to 
the year 2010. Other funding possibilities were not available for supporting 
African peace missions. Furthermore, owing to the EU’s legal structure, 
which leaves responsibility for military activities with the Member States, the 
EU cannot count on its own funds for military activities. This means that 
support for the APF can be provided only if the Member States agree on 
funds, which will then be supplied from development resources and em-
ployed for military purposes.  
5.4.4 Subordination 
Chapter 2 introduced a fourth theoretical approach to managing the nexus: 
the subordination of development policy to other policies. No empirical evi-
dence of this model was found in terms of external support for the APSA. 
This implies that development policy is not securitised in any of the relevant 
donor countries. Consequently, development policy in all these countries can 
either influence a common security policy or implement its own independent 
policy.  
In this subchapter, the management of interfaces by four donors is analysed. 
All of these donors are major supporters of the APSA. There is no best nexus 
management as such, and advantages and disadvantages, which depend on 
rationale and objectives pursued in each case, must be examined by policy-
makers. Besides institutional and legal restrictions, the importance of purely 
development-oriented goals, the required amount of financial resources and 
the range of activities will be decisive when it comes to choosing one of the 
four models. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the complementarity 
model is preferable to the distancing model since institutional structures are 
similar, whereas complementarity has some minor disadvantages, especially 
where a coherent approach is adopted. For the same reason, coordination may 
be a good choice, but it may also pose the potential risk of development pol-
icy having to subordinate its objectives and funding to security policy.  
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5.5 Coordination  
The following subchapters identify a number of problem areas – coordination 
of donor activities, donor orientation to the AU’s needs and problems related 
to donor funding – which are then analysed in greater depth. First, what 
should ideally be the standard with regard to these areas is outlined. Second, 
the current state of donor support with regard to these areas is summarised 
with a view to revealing, where possible, tendencies in donor behaviour.  
Donors have four options for coordinating their support for the APSA. First, 
they can pool their funds within a jointly agreed support framework. As a 
second option, they can also attempt to harmonise their efforts, i. e. adopt the 
same standards and reporting requirements for the recipient in question. 
Third, complementarity, or a division of labour, is another way in which 
donors can interact with one another. In this case, they share sectors and 
thematic areas among themselves, with the aim of avoiding donor crowding. 
Less result-oriented interaction may simply involve keeping each other regu-
larly informed of their various activities – the fourth form of coordination. 
This exchange of information makes individual donors’ actual activities 
transparent and may feed into individual country strategies towards the 
APSA. Needless to say, donors can also opt not to coordinate their efforts at 
any level (no pooling of resources, no harmonisation, no complementarity 
and no regular mechanism for exchanging information).  
The advantage of pooling funds is that donors can achieve their goals more 
effectively by pursuing a specific strategy that is in all likelihood divorced 
from the particularist interests of individual donors. The harmonisation of 
reporting requirements and other standards does not necessarily entail the 
pooling of funding but, like the pooling of funds, helps to reduce transaction 
costs and the burden on the recipient organisation or country. The advantage 
of complementarity is that the over- or underfunding of certain areas or struc-
tures of the APSA can be avoided. Although the fourth option, the institu-
tionalised exchange of information, is the least binding of all, it can also 
inject a high degree of transparency and effectiveness into donor activities. 
Not to coordinate efforts may be the easiest and cheapest option for donors, 
but it may not produce the most effective result, since there is a risk of sup-
port for the APSA becoming unbalanced and of the recipient of support being 
overburdened with reporting requirements.  
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The problems connected with any form of coordination are that it takes time 
to identify common interests and that donors with specific interests may not 
consider effectiveness their primary concern and so deliberately choose not to 
coordinate. The recipient, however, may prefer the pooling of resources and 
harmonisation in areas which attract a great deal of donor attention because 
this reduces the transaction costs of otherwise having to manage and interact 
with so many different donors.  
In the context of the APSA, two approaches are applied. First, an example of 
the pooled approach is the UNDP pool for capacity-building due to end in 
2006, but there are also smaller “pools”, such as Austria’s and Denmark’s 
cooperation on the APSA. With the end of UNDP pooled donor funding in 
sight, donors are looking for new and innovative approaches to pooling their 
efforts to support the AU. These donors include Germany, Sweden, Canada, 
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the EU. Harmonisa-
tion (after the UNDP pool ends) has not yielded any results, and complemen-
tarity can be identified only in the support for AMIS. 
Second, donors have formalised information exchange mechanisms, both at 
headquarters and in situ. At meta level there are the quarterly or semi-annual 
Clearing House meetings, the first of which took place in May 2004. They 
are attended by senior officers from the USA, the EU and Canada for the 
exchange of information on security assistance in the African continent. The 
topics discussed cover a range of security issues, including the building of 
African military capacities. Half-yearly conferences of the G8 plus a few 
other interested donors are also held in Addis Ababa for the discussion of 
support for the AU. 
The coordination mechanisms in Addis Ababa also focus on military issues, 
and in particular support for AMIS. They include the Partner Technical Sup-
port Group, chaired by the EU and comprising the political and military rep-
resentatives of all interested actors, who meet to discuss support for AMIS. 
The donors who attend are Denmark, France, the UK, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, the USA, Canada, NATO and the 
UN. The group instructs a group of representatives known as the Liaison 
Group to meet representatives of the Darfur Integrated Task Force, the AU 
unit responsible for AMIS. The AU and donor representatives meet twice a 
week to offer AMIS direct support  and to review the state of the mission on 
the ground. At these meetings, the EU represents the EU Member States. 
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Coordination among the Special Representatives of the USA, the EU and the 
AU in AMIS has also worked well.  
As regards military capacity-building, the UK has initiated and organises 
regular meetings of military attachés for the discussion and coordination of 
support for the ASF, including the ASF workshops. Outside the military area, 
peace and security are discussed in one forum, which is chaired by the EU 
programme manager for the AU. This is a donor-AU forum, which covers all 
aspects of donor support for the AU. In March 2006 it was considering 
whether to form thematic subgroups, including one for peace and security. 
In general, there is a tendency for donors to exchange information on activi-
ties and plans relating to peace and security, as the many meetings in situ 
prove. This makes for the transparency of donor activities in this field. How-
ever, the emphasis is on AMIS and building African military capacities. 
When it comes to the more development-oriented goals, such as  civilian 
components of the ASF, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, 
examples of coordination are rarer. This may be so, of course, because the 
AU itself is more dynamic in the areas of military capacity and peacekeeping 
missions and its absorptive capacity in other areas is relatively low. Neverthe-
less, it is important for donors to ensure that efforts in all areas of support are 
pooled or at least harmonised (especially after the UNDP project ends) and 
that there is a division of labour when commitments extend to civilian com-
ponents of the APSA.  
Political interests may also explain why some donors, such as the USA and 
France, show rather less interest in coordination through harmonisation, 
complementarity or pooling, although they do attend coordination meetings 
in situ. The USA seems to base its support for the APSA first and foremost 
on its own interests, rather than on a division of labour and its comparative 
advantage. Although France has opened its RECAMP programme to African 
and European partners, it is reluctant to coordinate closely with other donors. 
The USA, the UK and France have formally agreed on a common approach 
in Africa, although it has resulted not in close coordination among the three 
donors, but rather in the absence of interference in each other’s activities.  
5.6 Demand-orientation and flexibility 
Budget support would be the most demand-oriented type of support that do-
nors could provide. It would allow the recipients to allocate their funds freely, 
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according to their needs rather than what donors are willing to fund. How-
ever, the AU’s financial systems and the internal regulations of many donor 
countries do not inspire hope that budget support for the AU is imminent. 
Less demand-oriented support mechanisms might be in-kind or earmarked 
support for equipment or technical assistance. The defining characteristics 
here are reduced flexibility with regard to the service or product offered, 
especially if such contributions are not embedded in a strategy agreed with 
the partner.  
An interim model until budget support becomes an option is exemplified by 
the Danish and EU approaches. Denmark’s contribution to the APSA enjoys 
a good reputation with the AU and donors, even though its financial contribu-
tions are relatively low compared to those of other donors. Its flexible alloca-
tion of funds under its Africa Programme for Peace (2005-2009) allows it to 
hold regular, bi-annual consultations with the AU, at which the programme 
can be adjusted (DANIDA 2005, 18 f.). The programmatic approach, 
whereby money is allocated over a fixed period of time within the framework 
of a programme, makes funding reliable. This helps the AU to mobilise re-
sources for areas not covered by Danish support. The EU also provides the 
AU with much sought-after assistance through the African Peace Facility, 
which is also programmatic and could cover a broad spectrum of support for 
the AU. 
Donor approaches to demand-orientation differ widely. Although most do-
nors claim to cater to the AU’s needs, demand-orientation only really applies 
in the case of Denmark and the EU. It would indeed be possible for donors to 
be more demand-oriented without having to resort to budget support. This 
would mean providing flexible funding to meet AU needs (joint strategies 
and programmes) on a long-term basis. 
5.7 Funding  
Funding for the APSA is a challenge to donor support in two respects: first, 
the appropriate volume of support for the APSA has to be determined, and 
second, funding must be predictable. At the same time, the AU faces the 
challenge of ensuring the AU member states’ ownership, which should also 
be reflected in their willingness to pay into the AU’s operative budget more 
regularly.  
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A question that has arisen in the donor community and in Africa is whether it 
is justifiable to use funds set aside for development to address security chal-
lenges, be it for peacekeeping missions or military capacity-building. There 
are those who are opposed to using development instruments for security 
purposes. In Africa some countries ask why their development needs should 
be sacrificed to solve other countries’ security problems. Is there a way out of 
this conundrum?  
Donor countries or organisations concerned about using development funds 
for security purposes might begin by considering the option of setting up a 
new funding conduit specifically designed for security assistance. Relevant 
government departments (such as defence) in donor countries could serve as 
tributaries to the newly created security fund. Other (non-)state agencies with 
an interest in supporting security efforts would also contribute directly to this 
fund. Those interested in financing development would, in this case, continue 
to contribute through traditional development funding instruments.  
The second option would be to create a security adjunct to existing develop-
ment-funding instruments targeted specifically at peace and security. Donor 
countries and organisations would know, as and when they made contribu-
tions, that part of their development resources would be channelled into the 
security adjunct. A formula based on percentages or other technical consid-
erations might be used as a means of determining the amount of funds to be 
earmarked for either security or development.  
Whichever option is chosen, both development partners and African countries 
should bear in mind that financing security and development at the same time 
requires the donor community to commit more resources than it has tradition-
ally done. Sharing existing resources between security and development can 
only lead to complaints from countries receiving development assistance that 
they are being neglected. The justifiability of using development-funding 
instruments for security purposes would also continue to be questioned in the 
donor community. 
Another question that arises is how funding can be made predictable so as to 
ensure that the APSA, including the military options for action, is sustainable. 
At the same time, there are cases where donors have made commitments 
which they have not been able to honour when the time came. How can this 
kind of funding insecurity be addressed in the future? 
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Currently, support for peacekeeping missions includes multilateral-to-
multilateral support (e. g. the EU’s African Peace Facility), trust funds for 
particular missions as in the case of AMIS, bilateral arrangements (e. g. US 
support for AMIS) and military funding of/by African members states. When 
it comes to alternative funding for AU peacekeeping missions, UN-assessed 
contributions for peacekeeping missions by African regional organisations 
may be an option worth considering (Adebajo / Rashid 2004, 344). Especially 
in light of closer AU-UN cooperation, some authors argue that an agreement 
between the UN and African regional organisations must develop clear fund-
ing structures for regional peacekeeping operations in order to provide a 
regular and robust basis for UN assistance.  
The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change suggests that the 
rules for the UN peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the UN an 
option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations: “the rules of the 
United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United 
Nations the option, in very exceptional circumstances, to use assessed contri-
butions to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council, or 
the participation of regional organisations in multi-pillar peace operations 
under the overall United Nations umbrella” (High-level Panel 2004, 86).  
Yet, while this may seem a predictable source of funding and hence the way 
of the future, there are important and partly restrictive implications. As 
Cilliers points out: “such missions can only be mandated through the UN 
Security Council. This arrangement would probably require that the regional 
organisation present and defend the budget for a particular mission to the UN 
Security Council working with and through the UNDPKO. Or, it might re-
quire that the regional organization establish the necessary oversight and 
financial accountability structures” (Cilliers 2005). 
6 Conclusions 
The main question considered in the study is how development policy is 
contributing to the strengthening of the APSA. This section will summarise 
the most important findings of the study. Conclusions are drawn on three 
thematic areas. The first focus on the state of APSA, which is composed of 
the AU, acting as political coordinator, and the RECs, acting as implementing 
agencies. Civil society and regional powers are considered to be important 
factors of influence for this architecture. Secondly, we draw conclusions on 
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the characteristics of donor support for the APSA and indicate the major 
challenges that need to be addressed. Thirdly, there are conclusions on the 
role of development policy in the context of its nascent engagement in the 
field of peace and security. Lastly, we raise some questions for further re-
search related to the subject of our study.  
6.1 State of the APSA  
The new African Peace and Security Architecture arose from the transforma-
tion of the OAU into the AU and has been reinforced by newly established 
continental and regional structures and by the political step of deploying 
peacekeeping missions. Institutionally, the APSA is in place or has at least 
been launched, although further development and implementation very much 
depend on the political will of the AU member states and sustained donor 
support, both financially and politically. 
In general, the development of the APSA is proceeding well, despite the 
challenges the AU faces on several fronts. These challenges are partly due to 
its transformation from the OAU to a more dynamic and interventionist AU. 
The political dynamics among the AU’s member states will be one the main 
factors to determine whether it can promote good governance, stability and 
peace and security in Africa. 
The AU has both made progress and faced challenges in developing the 
APSA. Activities suggesting positive change have been the AU’s ability to 
act at political level to mandate peacekeeping missions, the steps it has taken 
to establish an African Standby Force and the ambitious political agenda it 
has set itself. Challenges that the AU faces consist in striking the right bal-
ance between establishing its structures and intervening in such emergency 
situations as Darfur to create stability. Furthermore, it may want to consider 
focusing more on conflict prevention and post-conflict issues to correct the 
current bias towards military capacity-building. Securing membership dues to 
the operative budget and the AU members’ political ownership are two fur-
ther formidable challenges, on which the AU’s future hinges.  
The African Peace and Security Architecture is still fragile and does not con-
stitute a fully operational structure as such. One major problem is the rela-
tionship between the AU, RECs and NEPAD, which is still only in its in-
fancy. The RECs, the AU’s implementing agents, are very heterogeneous and 
at very different stages in the development of their peace and security mecha-
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nisms. For functioning structures, all these interdependent elements must 
work together effectively.  
Support from donors is indispensable to the APSA’s future, and yet this is a 
time charged with political sensitivities. In such times, a ‘wrong’ political 
move by the AU may reduce donor enthusiasm for the APSA. A potential 
example of this was the debate surrounding the Sudanese Chairmanship of 
the AU.  
6.2 External support 
External support for the APSA is crucial and extensive, though with the focus 
on peace and security and, in this context, on military capacities and peace 
operations to the detriment of other AU programmes. Donors use a range of 
instruments and modes of delivery in support of the APSA, according to their 
national interests and internal peculiarities. Consequently, there is a great 
need for the coordination and harmonisation of their efforts. The debate on 
the UN takeover of AMIS shows that the modus operandi for future opera-
tions in general and the ‘AU first, UN later’ model in particular needs to be 
discussed further. 
External support for the APSA from all policy areas (development, defence 
and foreign) is essential. Unless these policies pay increasing attention to 
peace and security, the African structures will be de facto incapacitated. 
Technical, financial and logistical support is crucial in terms of both estab-
lishing the APSA structurally and enabling peacekeeping operations to take 
place. External political pressure on and increased media attention to the AU 
can have the impact needed if it is to live up to its constitution and resolu-
tions.  
Generally speaking, donors will have to ask themselves whether supporting 
the AU’s peace and security agenda without paying much attention to its 
other areas of engagement is a sensible long-term strategy. If donors do not 
want to create an AU that is primarily concerned with security issues in Af-
rica, considerable catching up needs to be done if the AU is to be able to 
perform all its functions as intended.  
The rise of the AU does not replace the need for UN engagement in Africa. 
There will therefore be a continued need for burden-sharing between the two 
institutions. In the area of peacekeeping, the ‘AU first, UN later’ approach is 
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likely to persist in the years to come, since it will take time for the AU to 
build up sufficient capacity. Discussions about the UN takeover of AMIS 
show that there is a need to consider whether the current modus operandi is a 
blueprint for future UN-AU cooperation. In general, the UN has comple-
mented and supported AU missions and transmits its knowledge within the 
framework of establishing the African Standby Force. Scope for support 
remains in the context of establishing an AU-integrated missions capability 
sooner rather than later, so that the negative implications of such a two-tiered 
model can be avoided.  
In their support for the APSA donors use a range of instruments, or modes of 
delivery, each with its distinct advantages and disadvantages. The way in 
which donors provide support shows, however, that important measures in 
the field of development, such as the pooling of resources and the harmonisa-
tion of standards and requirements have not been fully implemented. This 
may be due to the fact that the field of peace and security touches on the 
national interests of external actors and that donors are constrained by spe-
cific, internal rules and regulations. Hence the reluctance to pool resources or 
to institutionalise a ‘division of labour’ amongst donors in support of the 
APSA. While coordination on capacity-building for the APSA is weak, espe-
cially among the Regional Economic Communities, coordination efforts in 
respect of AMIS have been relatively strong. 
External actors have focused mainly on building military capacity and fund-
ing/supporting the peacekeeping missions mandated by the AU (Burundi and 
Darfur). In part, this is also due to the AU, since reform dynamics seem to 
revolve around the AU’s Peace Support Divisions and the Darfur Integrated 
Task Force, both of which are responsible for peace support operations. Fur-
thermore, owing to the internal and external political pressure on the AU to 
take action in emergency situations it has been difficult for both the AU and 
donors to pursue long-term development strategies.  
6.3 Nexus management – the interaction of three policies 
In supporting the APSA, foreign, defence and development policies must 
interact in some way, but there is no best overall solution. Generally, well 
coordinated and harmonised approaches are better than fragmented ones. The 
debate on nexus management is more of an issue on the donor than the Afri-
can side.  
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There is a need for external actors to apply the competencies and strengths of 
all three policies – development, defence and foreign – in helping to construct 
a viable peace and security architecture in Africa. Notwithstanding this in-
sight, it should be noted that, as these areas of competence cannot be neatly 
separated from each other, close collaboration, or what we call ‘nexus man-
agement’, is required. The nexus management models of external actors dif-
fer considerably, ranging from broadly integrated to more fragmented ap-
proaches. Owing perhaps to the absence of a tradition of cooperation among 
the policies in this field, several external actors are still struggling to manage 
this nexus. It is, after all, a field to which some actors are new in the African 
context, and it is certainly relatively new to the field of development as a 
whole. This problem will have to be tackled conceptually at a political level 
in the capitals of the donor countries and by the implementation structures in 
situ. Interestingly enough, the question of nexus management has not seemed 
to make a difference to the AU except where there has been competition for 
the same resources, as in cases where development funds are reallocated to 
peacekeeping missions.  
6.4 Other issues to be studied 
Since the area of study is quite new, this section sets out areas for further 
policy research based on the findings presented here. These further issues 
could yield interesting and important results with regard to donor contribu-
tions to the APSA. Firstly, it would be interesting to find out whether indi-
vidual donors’ nexus management has an effect on donor coordination and 
vice versa, i. e. does the way in which individual donors manage the nexus 
among three policies (development, defence and foreign) affect the way in 
which they interact with other donors and vice versa? Does a model where 
the three policies are remote from one another make it more difficult to coor-
dinate with the donor community, for example? Could a division of labour 
among donors by thematic areas lead to a model of closer cooperation among 
individual donors’ policies? With further access at headquarters level to deci-
sion-making processes and strategies relating to support for the APSA, this 
question of the relationship between nexus management and donor coordina-
tion would be an interesting extension of the study.  
Secondly, the question of the long-term funding mechanism, especially for 
peacekeeping missions, is important for further policy research. What might 
be the pros and cons of using UN-assessed contributions to assist the peace 
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support operations of regional organisations, including the AU and RECs? 
Could the disadvantages, political as well as financial, outweigh the possible 
benefits, so that it in fact continues to be better to mobilise resources from 
donors on an ad hoc basis or to count on the longevity of the EU’s African 
Peace Facility?  
Thirdly, ownership in the context of donor support for the APSA is a tricky 
and interesting question. It would be interesting to investigate systematically 
how and how far donors influence the AU’s and RECs’ peace and security 
agenda. If donor support was not tied to specific activities and conditions, 
would the AU’s priorities and activities change significantly? The AU is 
institutionally frail because it is still at the stage of developing its concepts 
and strategies in the area of peace and security. It is therefore crucial to con-
sider how donor influence at this level can be monitored. Another interesting 
aspect of this question is whether donor support has an affect on African 
ownership by actually reducing the commitment of African countries to the 
African Peace and Security Architecture.   
Fourthly, there is the question whether best practices based on development 
principles, as outlined in the Paris Declaration, for example, and bilateral 
development cooperation can be transferred to all policies (defence and for-
eign) in their interaction with multilateral organisations such as the AU. Is it 
actually feasible and does it make sense to apply a set of best practices 
gleaned from the world of development to all external assistance for the 
APSA? 
Lastly, there is room for a more detailed picture of how the nexus among the 
policies is managed at headquarters level in donor countries, since the study 
focuses mainly on nexus management in Addis Ababa. For example, is the 
absence of USAID at AU level a sign that it has no influence at all at strategy 
level? As USAID is also engaged in supporting the regional mechanisms, it 
needs to be asked whether our observations in Addis Ababa are actually due 
to the division of labour among the ministries under a single strategy. Since 
the study did not yield enough data on how decisions are made in capitals, 
this would be another option for further policy research.  
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Glossary 
Aid: “The words ‘aid’ and ‘assistance’ refer to flows which qualify as Offi-
cial Development Assistance (ODA) or Official Aid (OA)” (OECD/DAC 
2006). 
Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries, national 
development strategies, institutions and processes. Donors would progres-
sively depend on partner countries’ own systems, providing capacity-building 
support to improve these systems, rather than establishing parallel systems of 
their own (OECD/DAC 2005b). 
Budget support: Budget support is a financial contribution that is not ear-
marked for specific purposes. 
Co-deployment: Co-deployment involves the deployment of UN peacekeep-
ing troops alongside those of regional organisations. It is a military deploy-
ment or deployment of a field mission in conjunction with regional peace-
keeping forces specifically authorised by the UN Security Council. As such, 
it covers a variety of operational activities, such as training and monitoring 
local police, protecting safe havens and maintaining humanitarian relief cor-
ridors, caring for internally displaced persons and refugees, monitoring pro-
tection of human rights, and providing development assistance. The most 
important examples in Africa have been the UN and ECOWAS co-
deployments in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Francis et al. 2005, 52 f.). 
Commitment: “A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the 
necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assis-
tance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation. Bilateral com-
mitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of 
the time required for the completion of disbursements. Commitments to multi-
lateral organisations are reported as the sum of (i) any disbursements in the 
year reported on which have not previously been notified as commitments 
and (ii) expected disbursements in the following year” (OECD/DAC 2006). 
Complementarity (also known as ‘division of labour’): Donors share sectors 
and thematic areas among themselves with a view to avoiding the crowding 
of donors in particular sectors and areas. The consequence is that donors 
usually end up concentrating on a limited number of sectors or areas and 
sometimes have to disengage from others.  
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Conflict prevention: Conflict prevention is the object of a wide range of 
policies and initiatives to avoid the outbreak of a dispute or its escalation into 
violence. This may include activities focused on preventive diplomacy or a 
more comprehensive approach that is defined as structural prevention. An 
example of preventive diplomacy is the coordination of planning to prevent 
the outbreak of conflict when humanitarian aid is delivered and during the 
process of development. Another example might be the creation of a mecha-
nism to detect early warning signs and to record indicators that may help to 
predict impending violence. Longer-term structural approaches involve ad-
dressing the root causes of conflict. Conflict prevention encounters problems 
because it is extremely difficult to assess whether conflict prevention initia-
tives have been responsible for the failure of a conflict to happen (Johns 
Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) 2006). 
Grant: “Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment 
is required” (OECD/DAC 2006). 
Harmonisation: Harmonisation should focus on upstream analysis, joint 
assessments, joint strategies, coordination of political engagement and practi-
cal initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices. It thus includes 
donors’ reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement proce-
dures (OECD/DAC 2005b). 
In-kind contributions: A contribution is in kind if a donor provides the 
beneficiary with equipment rather than financial or technical support. 
Peace-building: Peace-building is undertaken in the aftermath of conflict; it 
means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will con-
solidate peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order 
to prevent a relapse into conflict; it often involves elections organised, super-
vised or conducted by the United Nations, the rebuilding of civil physical 
infrastructure and such institutions as schools and hospitals, and economic 
reconstruction (UN 2006a). 
Peace enforcement: Peace enforcement was first mentioned in the “Agenda 
for Peace”. It denotes the mission of forces under Article 43 of the UN Char-
ter to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. This task may ex-
ceed the mission of peacekeeping forces. Peace-enforcement units must 
therefore be more heavily armed than peacekeeping troops (Agenda for Peace 
1992). According to the High-Level Panel report, peace enforcement forms 
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part of operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission 
from the outset (High-Level Panel 2004, 58). 
Peace-making is a diplomatic process of brokering an end to conflict, princi-
pally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter; military activities contributing to peace-making include military-
to-military contacts, security assistance, shows of force and preventive de-
ployments (UN 2006a). 
Peacekeeping is a hybrid, politico-military activity aimed at conflict control, 
which usually involves the presence in the field of military and civilian per-
sonnel, with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the imple-
mentation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, 
separation of forces, etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive 
settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief (UN 2006a). 
Peace support operations include preventive deployments, peacekeeping 
and peace-enforcement operations, diplomatic activities, such as preventive 
diplomacy, peace-making and peace-building, as well as humanitarian assis-
tance, good offices, fact-finding and electoral assistance (UN 2006a).  
Political dialogue: Exchange of views between two or more cooperating 
parties at policy or management level. The objective is to reach an under-
standing on issues relevant and sensitive to both sides and to organise the 
present and future relationship of the partners involved. 
Pooled support: If donors pool their support, they combine their financial or 
technical support in one common basket administered by one actor, who is 
the one-stop agency for the partner. 
Post-conflict reconstruction has long-term economic, political and social 
reconstruction as its goal. The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) of ex-combatants plays a vital role in post-conflict reconstruction. 
Increasingly, it is understood that the mostly military-oriented tasks of disar-
mament and demobilisation will be successful only in combination with sus-
tainable reintegration measures, which must be implemented in close coop-
eration with local partners and communities. More holistically, post-conflict 
reconstruction includes such activities as assisting with elections, establishing 
the rule of law and governance structures, improving human rights situations 
and other measures that are important for long-term democracy, stability and 
reconciliation. 
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Official Development Assistance: Grants or loans to countries and territories 
on the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) list of developing 
countries which are: (a) provided by the official sector; (b) with promotion of 
economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) on concessional 
financial terms (in the case of loans, having a grant (q.v.) element of at least 
25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation (q.v.) is 
included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. 
For the treatment of forgiveness in the case of loans originally extended for 
military purposes, see Notes on Definitions and Measurement below 
(OECD/DAC 2005a). 
Ownership is a measurement of the extent to which partners participate and 
take responsibility. It assesses whether all actors affected are involved in the 
planning and implementation of instruments and whether local institutions, 
resources and expertise are used sufficiently (OECD/DAC 2005a). 
Re-hatting is a process in which regional or multinational forces have been 
deployed and are followed by a United Nations peacekeeping force (UN 
2005d, 2).  
Responsibility to protect: According to the High-Level Panel report, the 
responsibility to protect entails recognition that the issue is not any state’s 
“right to intervene” but its “responsibility to protect” when its people suffer 
as a result of an avoidable catastrophe – mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing 
by forcible expulsion, terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to dis-
ease. Sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect their 
own citizens from such catastrophes. When they are unable or unwilling to do 
so, that responsibility is assumed by the wider international community 
(High-Level Panel 2004, 56). The responsibility to protect has three dimen-
sions: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to 
rebuild. Military intervention should be considered only when preventive 
options have been exhausted (Government of Canada 2006a).  
Technical cooperation includes both (a) grants to nationals of aid recipient 
countries receiving education or training at home or abroad and (b) payments 
to consultants, advisers and similar personnel and to teachers and administra-
tors serving in recipient countries (including the cost of associated equip-
ment). Assistance of this kind provided specifically to facilitate the imple-
mentation of a capital project is included without distinction among bilateral 
project and programme expenditures and is not identified separately as tech-
nical cooperation in statistics of aggregate flows (OECD/DAC 2006).  
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